for requesting the transfer of findings so that it can perform its own tasks. The information thus obtained, therefore, may normally be used only to decide whether to
seek further information, and from what agency, and to provide better reasons for
such individual requests for data transfers. In contrast to this, in case of specific requests, and thus also when operational tasks are performed, the transfer of data from
the databases maintained by the various agencies is controlled by their relevant specialised law. Therefore, with regard to the simple basic data under § 3 sec. 1 no. 1a
ATDG, the counter-terrorism database does not authorise an exchange of information so that certain tasks can be performed, but only prepares such an exchange.
This applies even more to the extended basic data under § 3 sec. 1 no. 1b ATDG,
which, as a rule, the authorities may access only as provided by the transfer provisions governing their particular agency (§ 5 sec. 1 sentence 4 ATDG).
Consequently, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act relies heavily on each agency’s
legal bases for data transfers, from which it derives its legal limitations. As a result, it
ensures that – aside from cases under § 5 sec. 2, § 6 sec. 2 ATDG – an exchange of
data for direct use in investigating and combating international terrorism is permissible only subject to the legal requirements of the transfer provisions for each of the
agencies. It therefore balances the low requirements for initiating the receipt of information in advance of a threat – basically the question of necessity – with differentiated limits for the transfer of data. These restrictions must in turn meet the constitutional requirements and cannot be limited – at least not for data transfers between the
intelligence services and the police – to comparatively minor requirements such as
the data transfer being necessary for performing certain tasks or for preserving public
safety.
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(2) The function of the counter-terrorism database, which is essentially limited to facilitating access to information, significantly reduces the severity of its interference;
nevertheless, even in this function, the severity of interference is still considerable.
[…]
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Being included in such a database can represent a substantial hardship for the persons concerned. Once somebody has been included in the database, this person
must expect, in the event of a search, to be categorised as affiliated with terrorism
and – through further investigative requests thus facilitated – to be subjected to associated burdensome measures. The consequences of such a categorisation can be
substantial, and they can place individuals in difficult situations without their knowing
about the categorisation or having any practical way of defending themselves against
it. The significance of this interference is intensified by the fact that the data are
recorded in the database in isolation from their respective specific backgrounds, and
may in part be founded on mere prognoses and subjective assessments by the authorities, which are uncertain by their very nature. Ultimately, citizens may thereby be
exposed to considerable adverse consequences without having given any cause for
which they themselves are accountable. It is true that in general, burdensome measures cannot be based directly on a use of the data in the counter-terrorism database
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