3. […]
104
III.
The counter-terrorism database, which was established by the challenged provisions, is in its fundamental design compatible with the right to informational selfdetermination under Art. 2 sec. 1 in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. The principle of
proportionality does not fundamentally oppose such a database, which, in the context
of investigating and combating international terrorism, serves to initiate the receipt of
information, and in emergencies also serves to defend against dangers. However, also its individual provisions detailing the structure of the database must comply with
the principle of proportionality.
105
1. The counter-terrorism database has a legitimate aim. It is primarily meant to inform security agencies quickly and easily of whether other security agencies have relevant information about certain persons associated with international terrorism. It
thus aims to provide preliminary information with which these agencies can initiate
searches of information from other authorities faster and more expediently, and that
in emergencies can also permit a first assessment of a threat so as to guide further
action. The legislature does not seek a general exchange of personal data among all
security agencies, or the elimination of all bounds on information between these
agencies; this would circumvent the principle of purpose limitation, and would therefore be from the outset impermissible. What the legislature intends to provide is only a
limited facilitation of information transfer. This transfer of information is to leave the
various agencies’ rules on transfers in force, and its subject matter is to remain restricted to combating international terrorism. Although the term “terrorism” is not unambiguous in itself, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act uses § 129a of the Criminal
Code as guidance; this derives from § 2 sentence 1 no. 1a ATDG – the central provision concerning the persons included in the database. “Terrorism”, in this context,
thus means specifically defined, serious criminal offences directed at the intimidation
of the public or against the fundamental structures of a state or of an international organisation. This does not raise any constitutional objections.
106
2. The challenged provisions are also suitable and necessary to achieve this purpose. The data storage obligations under §§ 1 to 4 ATDG create a basic data inventory that is made available to the participating authorities pursuant to § 5 sec. 1, § 6
sec. 1 sentence 1 ATDG so that they can prepare further requests for information,
and that is intended to provide them with information to protect against specific
threats in particularly urgent cases, under § 5 sec. 2, § 6 sec. 2 ATDG. No other set of
instruments that ensures these goals with comparable efficacy and less interference
with rights is evident.
107
3. In its fundamental design, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act is also compatible
with the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense.
108
The principle of proportionality in the narrow sense requires that in an overall as-
109
21/45