ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
49
except materials containing information about undercover agents or police
informers or about the organisation and tactics of operational-search
measures. That exception was justified by the necessity to ensure the
security and protection of undercover agents and police informers and their
family members and was therefore compatible with the Convention.
199. The Government further referred to the Plenary Supreme Court’s
Ruling of 27 June 2013, which explained to the lower courts that any
restrictions on human rights and freedoms had to be prescribed by law and
be necessary in a democratic society, that is, proportionate to a legitimate
aim. Courts were instructed to rely on established facts, verify the existence
of relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a restriction on an individual’s
rights and balance the interests of the individual whose rights were being
restricted against the interests of other individuals, the State and society as a
whole. The OSAA explicitly required the courts to give reasons for the
decision to authorise interception. In line with the Constitutional Court’s
decision of 8 February 2007 (see paragraph 42 above), the interception
authorisation was to refer to the specific grounds for suspecting the person
in respect of whom operational-search measures were requested of a
criminal offence or of activities endangering national, military, economic or
ecological security. In its decision of 2 October 2003 (see paragraph 41
above), the Constitutional Court also held that judges had an obligation to
examine the materials submitted to them carefully and thoroughly.
200. According to the Government, in practice, each interception
authorisation specified: the State agency responsible for performing the
interception; the grounds for conducting the surveillance measures and the
reasons why they were necessary; a reference to applicable legal provisions,
the person whose communications were to be intercepted; the grounds for
suspecting that person’s involvement in the commission of a specific
criminal offence; that person’s telephone number or IMEI code; the period
of time for which the authorisation was granted; and other necessary
information. In exceptional circumstances it was permissible to authorise
the interception of communications of unidentified persons. As a rule, in
such cases a judge authorised the collection of data from technical channels
of communication in order to identify the persons present at a specific
location at the time that a criminal offence was committed there. That
practice was compatible with the principles established in the Court’s caselaw, because in such cases the interception authorisation specified a single
set of premises (locations) as the premises (locations) in respect of which
the authorisation was ordered (they referred to Kennedy, cited above).
201. Russian law permitted communications to be intercepted without
prior judicial authorisation in urgent cases. A judge had to be informed of
any such case within twenty-four hours and judicial authorisation for
continuing the interception had to be obtained within forty-eight hours.
According to the Government, the judge had to examine the lawfulness of