44
ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
subjected to interception measures. In particular, surveillance measures
were not limited to persons suspected or accused of criminal offences. Any
person who had information about a criminal offence could have his
telephone tapped. Furthermore, interception was not limited to serious and
especially serious offences. Russian law allowed interception measures in
connection with offences of medium severity, such as, for example,
pickpocketing.
183. The Government submitted that interception of communications
might be conducted only following the receipt of information that a criminal
offence had been committed, was being committed or was being plotted;
about persons conspiring to commit, or committing, or having committed a
criminal offence; or about events or activities endangering the national,
military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation. The
Constitutional Court had held in its ruling of 14 July 1998 that collecting
information about a person’s private life was permissible only with the aim
of preventing, detecting and investigating criminal offences or in pursuance
of other lawful aims listed in the OSAA.
184. Only offences of medium severity, serious offences and especially
serious offences might give rise to an interception order and only persons
suspected of such offences or who might have information about such
offences could be subject to interception measures. The Government
submitted in this connection that the Court had already found that
surveillance measures in respect of a person who was not suspected of any
offence could be justified under the Convention (referring to Greuter v. the
Netherlands (dec.), no. 40045/98, 19 March 2002).
185. Further, in respect of interceptions for the purpose of protecting
national security, the Government argued that the requirement of
“foreseeability” of the law did not go so far as to compel States to enact
legal provisions listing in detail all conduct that might prompt a decision to
subject an individual to surveillance on “national security” grounds
(see Kennedy, cited above, § 159).
(iii) The duration of secret surveillance measures
186. The applicant submitted that the OSAA did not explain under what
circumstances interception could be extended beyond six months. Nor did it
establish the maximum duration of interception measures.
187. The Government submitted that under Russian law interception
might be authorised by a judge for a maximum period of six months and
might be extended if necessary. It had to be discontinued if the investigation
was terminated. They argued that it was reasonable to leave the duration of
the interception to the discretion of the domestic authorities, having regard
to the complexity and the duration of the investigation in a specific case (see
Kennedy, cited above). They also referred to the case of Van Pelt v. the
Netherlands (no. 20555/92, Commission decision of 6 April 1994,