IPCO Annual Report 2018
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) and Surveillance
12.6
The powers available to each authority have been determined by a careful process of
analysis and consideration before ratification by Parliament. However, there are some
instances where changes in culture, technology, trends in illicit behaviours, or reallocation
of public responsibility, will mean that the available powers do not necessarily align with an
authority’s investigative requirements.
12.7
In some cases, we have been persuaded that it would be appropriate for specific authorities
to have wider powers, for example to allow them to conduct property interference
operations to support an existing investigative function. We have recommended that one
organisation, the MHRA, should discuss this issue further with the Home Office, who are
responsible for reviewing the function of the legislation and may be in the position to
recommend an amendment to the legislation to support this change.
12.8
Another organisation, OFSTED, which had not made use of its directed surveillance
powers for many years, had been considering seeking its removal from the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) schedule following its last inspection. However, a
surge in the type of activity, which it is there to protect against, prompted a change in view.
We were pleased to see that OFSTED had invested in training and updated policies, despite
the lack of use, leaving them prepared for the surge.
12.9
In general, however, we have seen an increase in the use of directed surveillance
powers on 2017.
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
933
1,122
200
0
2017
2018
Figure 9: Directed Surveillance Authorisations (DSAs) 2017-2018
12.10
At our inspection of one public authority in 2018, we saw a particularly good demonstration
of necessity and proportionality consideration in the use of DSAs. We did not inspect any
renewal documentation, because the authority had ceased surveillance in each case at the
earliest appropriate opportunity. They have worked to raise the level of awareness and
communication as part of an ongoing compliance strategy; notably, they have introduced a
monthly newsletter from the Covert Authorities Bureau (CAB) to keep colleagues updated
on RIPA issues and help raise the profile and availability of the CAB for internal advice.
We are encouraged by this approach to compliance culture and would encourage similar
initiatives to be introduced elsewhere. Our inspection found that management of online
research into suspected fraudulent activity, undertaken by a dedicated team of trained
83