IPCO Annual Report 2018
11.27
LEAs currently use a variety of IT systems and hard copy documents to maintain records
of applications and authorisations for surveillance. At the time of our inspection, one
authority was procuring a new covert management system. We expect to see a reduction in
the number of administrative errors in 2019 once this new system is in place.
11.28
The standard of compliance in both the applications and authorisations for directed
surveillance at one organisation was very good. In particular, we found that Authorising
Officers (AOs) made pertinent entries regarding their considerations of necessity and
proportionality and made each case bespoke to the crime and subjects in question.
However, our inspection at this organisation identified that internal oversight of open
source activity was inadequate. We would expect to see significant improvements in this
area, including the introduction of internal auditing policies, before the next inspection.
11.29
At one LEA, where we had previously expressed concerns that officers were not fully
documenting the actions authorised, we found a significant improvement in records kept
for urgent oral authorisations. We examined a range of relevant paperwork and we have a
high level of confidence that use of the urgency procedures are appropriate and compliant
with the CoP. This reflected a significant effort by the force to improve officer training. By
contrast, we found shortcomings on another inspection, where the LEA was falling short
of the required standard, relying heavily on formulaic text and insufficient proportionality
statements. We have recommended that AOs should ensure that the points to cover in the
CoP are adequately addressed in each case.
11.30
In 2018, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) informed us of some significant
errors, where individuals had been used as CHIS without appropriate authorisation under
RIPA and other cases where there had been inappropriate disclosure to defendants
regarding persons being authorised as CHIS during prosecution proceedings. We responded
to HMRC’s reports by conducting a detailed inspection of these cases to ensure that
appropriate remedial action was being taken. This inspection, which took place in 2019,
noted substantial progress in this area since the error had been identified. We will continue
to keep this issue under close review.
Property Interference
11.31
Property interference, conducted under Part 3 of the Police Act, includes any interference
with property which does not fall under the definition of equipment interference in the IPA.
In many cases, the police will conduct these actions overtly under different powers, which
IPCO does not oversee.
Example: use of property interference when monitoring a private property or vehicle
A covert listening device was installed in a van belonging to a person suspected of being
involved in the importation of counterfeit cigarettes using the cover of a legitimate
business. The device gathered evidence of the subject arranging the importation of the
cigarettes and the distribution of them within the UK. Evidence from the device allowed the
police to confirm that two members of the business were involved in coordinating distribution
and were able to use this to progress an investigation into both parties.
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