IPCO Annual Report 2018
Surveillance and Property Interference
7.8
Our findings in this area are consistent with last year’s report; SIS conducts very little
surveillance activity in the UK and our inspections have not identified any issues in terms
of methodology or intelligence handling. We were content that the limited surveillance
activity undertaken by SIS in the UK was necessary and proportionate.
7.9
At one inspection, we spoke to surveillance practitioners at SIS. As above, we are mindful
of the complexities of work that might have a global or trans-national reach and wanted
to test that operators are clear on the restrictions and safeguards in place under RIPA. We
are confident that SIS officers are trained on how RIPA applies to surveillance activities and
understand when an authorisation should be sought before proceeding.
Targeted Interception (TI) and Equipment Interference (EI)
7.10
As with the other agencies, our inspection of these powers in 2018 bridged the gap
between the old RIPA and new Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) regimes. In general, SIS
achieved a good level of compliance. In most cases, renewal applications always included
a statement of whether confidential information had been collected, although it was not
always clear if confidential information had not been collected. We suggested that a more
consistent approach should be adopted and that nil returns should be articulated in the
renewal application if material had not been collected.
Additional targeted interception and targeted examination provisions
7.11
As detailed in chapter 2, the IPA sets out provisions to obtain warrants to interception
communications for a group of persons or more than one organisation or set of premises.
We did not inspect any thematic authorisations at SIS during 2018. We will focus on this
in the future, although previous inspections and our oversight via the double lock confirm
that this activity will be limited given SIS’s focus on activities outside of the UK. From
conversations with SIS, we are confident that they will apply careful consideration before
seeking thematic authorisations.
7.12
SIS did not apply for any warrants under section 17(2)(c) in relation to training or testing
activities in 2018.
Targeted equipment interference warrants
7.13
As described in chapter 6 we conducted light touch inspections of these warrants towards
the end of 2018 and did not inspect a substantial number of thematic authorisations. We
intend to review these closely in 2019. Our oversight via the double lock did not raise any
concerns in this area and the JCs did not reject any thematic applications.
Bulk Communications Data (BCD)
7.14
SIS has not undertaken bulk acquisition of Communications Data (CD) in 2018. SIS has
access to certain BCD lawfully obtained by the Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) and MI5 where it is operationally necessary.
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