IPCO Annual Report 2018
7. Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS)
Overview
7.1
We conducted regular inspections of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) at both the
London headquarters and overseas stations throughout the year. These inspections focused
on the range of powers used by SIS. SIS work overseas is conducted under section 1 of the
Intelligence Services Act (ISA) and in reliance on section 7 as required and when properly
authorised. We have discussed with SIS whether oversight of work carried out under
section 1, which does not currently fall withinthe Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s
Office’s (IPCO) formal remit, should be expanded to increase IPCO scrutiny of SIS’s work.
To date, briefings in relation to work conducted under section 1 that fall outside of IPCO’s
statutory remit have been delivered during station inspections with formal oversight
of this work falling to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and (post facto) the
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). It is for the Government to consider whether
there are sufficient resources in this area to ensure that this oversight is carried out to a
satisfactory standard.
Findings
7.2
We have been impressed by the careful consideration by legal officers which permeates
SIS’s work and use of covert powers. The international scope of SIS’s function places officers
within a complex framework of domestic, foreign, international and European legislation.
SIS has taken time to brief and debate certain issues with our office and has drawn to our
attention a number of sensitive and complicated issues. We are confident that SIS’s legal
teams are consistently engaged in operational matters and in dialogue with counterparts at
other agencies and within departments of state, including the FCO in particular.
7.3
SIS work closely with liaison partners in countries where intelligence is shared regularly, if
not daily. Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), the Secretary of State is required
to ensure that an intercept or equipment interference (EI) product is only disclosed
overseas if the relevant safeguards will apply to such an extent (if any) as the Secretary
of State considers appropriate. This requires SIS to have sufficient understanding of the
handling arrangements in place with relevant foreign partners to provide any advice
required by the Secretary of State. To help achieve this, and as a matter of best practice
more generally, we have suggested that SIS officers should take steps to understand how
UK data will be used or retained by partner services. We recommended that SIS should
progress data handling and retention work, where possible and appropriate, with liaison
and create a record covering how intelligence will be stored, accessed, reviewed and
deleted by partners.
7.4
During some station inspections, we focused on how SIS manages its relationships with
liaisons posing higher human rights and compliance risks. SIS applies particularly close
scrutiny to decisions to share intelligence to facilitate or solicit a detention, as this often
engages the Consolidated Guidance. Overall, we were impressed with the rigorous
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