16
IPCO Annual Report 2018
• We consider in detail the authorisations for all juvenile CHIS on inspections. This involves
an examination of the authorisation, review, renewal and cancellation paperwork, as well
as risk assessments. We also usually meet the officer responsible for authorisation and the
day-to-day management of a juvenile as a CHIS and will closely review the documentation
which records the rationale for their continued use and conduct;
• On the basis of these detailed reviews, the IPC is satisfied that those who grant such
authorisations do so only after very careful consideration of the inherent risks. Concerns
around the safeguarding of children and the public authority’s duty of care to the child are
key considerations in the authorisation process;
• On many occasions Authorising Officers (AOs) refuse to sanction the use of a juvenile.
The very small number of juveniles who have been authorised as CHIS during the last
four years, often for limited periods, are in most cases on the cusp of adulthood. Public
authorities are reticent to authorise juveniles unless the criminality and risk of harm to
individuals and communities are of a high order and cannot be resolved in less intrusive
ways; and
• As the IPC explained in his letter to the Joint Committee,10 juveniles considered as
potential CHIS are already engaged in criminality, often at great personal risk. Juvenile
CHIS are not tasked to participate in criminality they are not already involved in. Becoming
a CHIS can, potentially, offer a way to extricate themselves from such harm; the IPC noted
that decisions to authorise were only made where this is the best option for breaking the
cycle of crime and danger for the individual.
2.31
We will keep the use of this particularly sensitive tactic under close review on our regular
inspections of the relevant public authorities and we will provide annual updates on the
number of authorisations, as well as any specific issues of note, through future Annual
Reports.
Additional targeted interception and targeted examination provisions
(section 17(2) of the IPA)
2.32
The IPA introduces provisions for several categories of authorisations, formalising the
permissions and safeguards for what might be considered to be atypical applications.
These include operations where the target set may not be well defined, or where there
is a higher-than-usual expectation of intrusion into privacy, including potentially that of
the public. These are often referred to as thematic warrants. This is an area which was
extensively debated in Parliament during the passing of the Act; this has therefore been an
important feature of our oversight and will continue to be so.
Section 17(2) of the IPA provides additional permissions to apply for targeted interception
warrants or targeted examination warrants. These may relate to:
(a) a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a
particular activity;
(b) more than one person or organisation, or more than one set of premises, where the
conduct authorised or required by the warrant is for the purposes of a single investigation or
operation; or
(c) testing or training activities.
10 https://www.ipco.org.uk/docs/Juvenile%20CHIS%20March%208%202019.pdf