IPCO Annual Report 2017
Complex and technical operations
4.31
The intelligence agencies and the MOD have adopted a thoughtful and sensible approach
to surveillance principles during the process of developing new techniques. We inspected
a range of authorisations for non-traditional surveillance, including by complex technical
means. In most cases, authorising officers have taken care to describe the likely extent
of intrusion from the operation but in some highly technical operations it can be difficult
to explain simply the true nature and scope of the operation. The MOD has adopted
the practice of annexing project proposals to the surveillance application form. We
recommended that the intelligence agencies adopt this approach, and ensure they apply
a clear policy on any technical terms and descriptions that are set out in these annexes.
Renewal paperwork
4.32
We inspected a range of directed surveillance renewal authorisation documents for the
intelligence agencies and we recommended that more detail was provided about any
action that had been taken during the original period of authorisation. Renewal documents
must reflect the content and value of the surveillance activity. MI5 keep a record of
surveillance activities under surveillance authorisations. These are centrally retrievable
but they are not set out in a single format. The renewal document, furthermore, does not
always provide a full reflection of the surveillance activity captured in these records. We
have recommended that renewals would benefit from the inclusion of specific examples
of activity and intelligence.
4.33
We found that MI5 and the MOD often simplify renewal forms by focusing on primary
methods of surveillance and they fail to refer to all of the actions that have been authorised.
For both directed and intrusive surveillance, the focus is often on a single or primary target,
and does not reflect the totality of the likely intrusion. For example, in one case at the MOD
an agent was used to facilitate an intrusive surveillance operation but the agent, not the
targets, were the subject of the intrusion considerations. We recommended that the totality
of surveillance activity is considered on authorisation and renewal paperwork.
GCHQ authorising officer considerations
4.34
During our first inspection of the year at GCHQ, it was suggested that the authorising officer
should record their considerations to demonstrate that they have taken into account the
necessity and proportionality of the proposed surveillance. In a follow-up review, we noted
that this recommendation had been implemented: the authorising officers are providing a
succinct summary of the relevant considerations, and their approach to any unusual factors
relevant to the case.
Local Authorities:
4.35
Our inspectors did not identify any significant change in compliance compared to previous
years when inspected by the OSC.
Seriousness of crime threshold
4.36
We identified a small number of cases in England and Wales for which the offence and
the available sentence were not sufficiently described. These cases should not have been
approved and we have encouraged councils to ensure the documents are clear on this point.
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