Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner - March 2015
Section 11
Prisons
11.1 In this section I shall provide an outline of the legislation governing the
interception of prisoners’ communications, give details of our prison inspection regime
and summarise the key findings from our inspections.
11.2 I have continued to provide non-statutory oversight of the interception of
communications in prisons in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as did my predecessors.
I do not currently provide any oversight for prisons in Scotland. It would be preferable, in
my view, if prison oversight was formalised as a statutory function.
11.3 This non-statutory oversight of prisons in England and Wales commenced in 2002
at the request of the then Home Secretary. My office was invited to undertake inspections
of the Northern Ireland Prisons by the then Director General of Northern Ireland Prisons
in 2008.
11.4 In England and Wales Function 4 of the National Security Framework (NSF)
governs the procedures for the interception of prisoners’ communications (telephone
calls and mail). There are also various Prison Service Instructions (PSIs) (such as 49/2011,
56/2011, 24/2012, 10/2013, 07/2015, 10/2013) that impact on this area. Last year I
made the point that the numerous policy documents are fragmented, overlapping and
contradictory in places and this makes it difficult for the prisons themselves to understand
the requirements fully and for our inspectors to conduct the oversight. Since the previous
reporting year our inspectors have again come across new PSIs whilst actually inspecting
prisons. This is problematic as in these instances we had not had the opportunity to align
our inspection baselines to the new policy. Concerns have again been raised with the
Security Group, National Offender Management Service (NOMS) as to why we were not
notified in advance of the implementation dates of PSIs that affect the arrangements for
the interception of prisoners’ communications.
11.5 Last year I reported that NOMS was working towards implementing an Interception
PSI. This has still not been implemented at the time of writing this report which is
astonishing considering it has now been in draft for a number of years. I maintain the
view that if an Interception PSI is introduced it should replace all other PSIs. Otherwise
it will be very confusing for the establishments who are trying to introduce systems and
procedures if there are numerous PSIs covering this activity and a lack of clarity over
which PSI takes precedence.
11.6 Furthermore it is exasperating that NOMS has still not formally introduced the
interception risk assessment template that was designed in 2011. My office has been
informed that this is due to happen at some point in March 2015. Our inspectors have
found themselves in a difficult position for several years now whereby they are effectively
being asked to promote the use of templates which have not been formally ratified.
11.7 I reiterate that NOMS must get to grips with these issues and put in place a
clear defined policy and risk assessment documents for the interception of prisoners’
communications. Our inspections generally find that the prisons are trying extremely
hard to comply with the various policies in this area, but they are in need of clear direction
and better quality policy. The prison staff my inspectors meet during the inspections have
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