Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner - March 2015
7.66 In a couple of the operations examined the inspectors concluded that there
were potentially gaps in the acquisition process where the investigation teams had
not identified the full range of data necessary to achieve the objective. This failure to
identify relevant data may adversely impact on the ability to, for example, corroborate
the account given by a witness, corroborate the testimony and / or determine the last
known whereabouts of a victim or properly determine the role of a suspect in a crime
or indicate their innocence. This may present the acquisition process as arbitrary and
serious implications could result. This is an area in which it is important for the SPOCs to
engage with the applicants to develop strategies to ensure that the appropriate data is
sought to fully achieve the investigative objective.
7.67 In the operations where large elements of the offences, if not all the offences,
took place within a ‘virtual world’ e.g. some of the fraud and sexual offences, the
requirement for communications data was ever more apparent. It was also apparent from
these operations that as technologies have developed police forces and law enforcement
agencies have increasingly looked at a wider range of technologies to investigate offences.
The inspectors noted that in relation to the investigation of serious and organised
criminals, the increasing tactical awareness of criminals means that a larger amount of
data, on a potentially wider range of devices and individuals, has to be acquired to meet
operational objectives which may have been more simply achieved in previous years.
7.68 To summarise the inspectors found that a proportion of the communications data
applications in each operation were not adequately formulated, i.e. they did not address
the necessity or proportionality principles sufficiently. This does raise the question as to
whether those represent significant institutional overuse. The inspectors also identified
that in a couple of the operations examined there were potentially gaps in the acquisition
process where the investigation teams had not identified the full range of data necessary
to achieve the objective. I will come back to these points and try to answer the question
after describing the other inquiries that we have undertaken in the reporting year, as a
number of these have provided further evidence and assisted me to answer the question
as to whether there is significant institutional overuse.
Inquiry into 999/112 emergency calls
7.69 The code of practice accompanying Chapter II of Part I RIPA 2000 acknowledges
certain CSPs have obligations under the Communications Act 200337 relating to
the provision of 999/112 emergency calls. Caller location information provides the
geographical position of the equipment being used by the person making the emergency
calls and facilitates a fast response where the caller to the emergency service is unable
to give their location.
37 There are several EU Directives and Frameworks that contribute to make up the 999/112 Emergency Calls
requirements – the Directive 2002/22/Ec Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 7 March
2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive). The Communications Act 2003 and the General Conditions of Entitlement
transposes, into UK law, the various EU Directives and EU Frameworks relating to 999/112 Emergency Calls
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