Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner - March 2015
intelligence value / benefit of the interception to enable an assessment to be made as to
whether the conduct remains necessary and proportionate. Another example might be
to run query based searches on keywords (e.g. “solicitor”, “legal”) to identify cases where
communications subject to legal privilege may have been intercepted and retained. My
office is then able to check whether that material has been handled in accordance with
the section 15 safeguards and the special procedures outlined in Chapter 3 of the code of
practice. It is this post-authorisation or downstream audit of what is (or just as importantly
what is not) being done with the material that brings more scrutiny and oversight to the
process.
6.58 In a large number of instances we are conducting our audit between renewals and
this enables us to reassess the necessity and proportionality of the conduct authorised
and review whether the conduct was foreseen by the person authorising the interception.
Through our observations we have in a number of cases recommended a warrant’s
modification, required changes to operational practice to safeguard privacy, required
additional information to be provided to the Secretary of State straight away or at the
point of next renewal, or recommended a warrant’s cancellation.
6.59 This audit function is easily achievable with the majority of the law enforcement
interception agencies as they hold the warrant documentation and the intelligence
reports relating to the intercepted material on sterile systems (due to the requirement
to separate interception related documentation and intelligence from other business
areas which are subject to the disclosure provisions of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996). The same is not the case for the intelligence agencies
as their systems in general do not separate out intercepted material from other types
of intelligence which of course we have no statutory function to oversee. Although we
have already made arrangements to view the applications electronically in a number
of the intelligence agencies, we continue to explore how we might bring about more
scrutiny and oversight to other parts of the process by electronic means. At present we
are requiring further information and reports to be provided to us during inspections and
are also interviewing staff on these matters.
6.60 Retention, Storage and Deletion. In my last annual report I reported on the
process undertaken to examine the interception agencies’ systems and policies in
relation to the retention, storage and destruction of intercepted material (and related
communications data)27.
6.61 In brief, I wrote to all interception agencies in August 2013 requiring them to
provide my office with full and systematically organised information about the retention,
storage and destruction of the product of interception, in every generic database in which
intercepted material (and related communications data) is for a time stored. I asked the
interception agencies to have an eye to section 15(3) of RIPA 2000, which provides:
“The requirements of this subsection are satisfied in relation to the intercepted
material and any related communications data if each copy, made of any of
27 See Paragraphs 3.48 to 3.57 of my 2013 Annual Report
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