Judgment Approved by the court for handing down.

R (Bridges) -v- CC South Wales & ors

would wish to satisfy themselves that everything reasonable which could be done had
been done in order to make sure that the software used does not have a racial or gender
bias.
202.

For the above reasons this appeal will be allowed on Ground 5.

Procedural matters
203.

For the sake of completeness we mention briefly two procedural matters which were
before us at the hearing of the appeal. They both relate to applications to refer to new
material, which was not before the Divisional Court because it did not exist at that time.
This Court has a discretion to permit such evidence under CPR 52.21(2). It is wellestablished that the discretion is to be exercised having regard to the criteria in Ladd v
Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489: see Terluk v Berezovsky [2011] EWCA Civ 1534, at
[31]-[32] (Laws LJ).

204.

The first request (no formal application being thought to be necessary) was made on
behalf of the Information Commissioner to refer to two documents which have been
issued by her since the judgment of the Divisional Court. The first of those documents
is ‘The Use of Live Facial Recognition Technology by Law Enforcement in Public
Places’ (31 October 2019). The other document is an ‘appropriate policy document’
template in relation to law enforcement processing under Part 3 of the DPA 2018.

205.

Mr Beer did not object to our looking at these documents in general terms, although he
did object insofar as reference might be made to any matter of fact which was not before
the Divisional Court. While we found the first document interesting, it did not affect
our decision or our reasons in this appeal. We have considered the ‘appropriate policy
document’ template in relation to Ground 4 for the reasons we set out in paras. 160 and
161 of this judgment, which reflect the decision of the Divisional Court in paras. [139][141] of their judgment.

206.

The other procedural matter to be addressed is an application on behalf of the
Surveillance Camera Commissioner to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a letter
dated 4 December 2019 which was sent to the Secretary of State by, amongst others,
the Surveillance Camera Commissioner. This was said to be relevant to an issue
mentioned by the Divisional Court in its judgment, at [44], where reference was made
to the fact that the Secretary of State has set up an Oversight and Advisory Board (“the
Board”), comprising representatives from the police and other bodies, including the
Surveillance Camera Commissioner, “to coordinate consideration of the use of facial
imaging and AFR by law enforcement authorities.” As we understand it, a
disagreement has arisen since the judgment of the Divisional Court between the
Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the Secretary of State as to the role performed
by the Board.

207.

On behalf of the Secretary of State objection was taken to the admissibility of this
evidence by Mr O’Brien, although he was content that we should look at it on a
contingent basis.

208.

We need not take time over this procedural dispute. It seems to us that Mr O’Brien was
right to submit that the setting up of the Board was at most a peripheral point, mentioned
in passing in the Divisional Court’s judgment. It does not seem to us to have had any

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