Judgment Approved by the court for handing down.
R (Bridges) -v- CC South Wales & ors
content of SWP's policies may be altered and improved over the
course of this trial. The possibility (or even the likelihood) of
such improvement is not evidence of present deficiency.
97. Finally, under this heading, we refer to the comments by the
Home Secretary (in her Biometrics Strategy) as to the legal
framework within which AFR Locate presently operates (see
above, at paragraph 67). In our view, when considered in
context, these comments should be considered as amounting to
pragmatic recognition that (a) steps could, and perhaps should,
be taken further to codify the relevant legal standards; and (b)
the future development of AFR technology is likely to require
periodic re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the legal regime. We
respectfully endorse both sentiments, in particular the latter. For
the reasons we have set out already, we do not consider that the
legal framework is at present out of kilter; yet this will inevitably
have to be a matter that is subject to periodic review in the
future.”
58.
We find the references by the Court to the possibility of future reconsideration of this
issue a little curious. This is because either an interference is in accordance with the
law or it is not. The issue of whether there is relevant “law” for this purpose is a binary
question: see In re Gallagher, at [14] (Lord Sumption JSC). The fact that this case
involved the trial of a new technology does not alter the need for any interference with
Article 8 rights to be in accordance with the law.
59.
Mr Squires QC invited us to have regard to hypothetical scenarios which may arise in
the future, for example if the large network of CCTV cameras in this country were to
be connected to AFR Locate in such a way that a person’s movements around the
country could be tracked. In support of that submission Mr Squires urged upon us what
was said in the dissenting judgment of Lord Kerr JSC in Beghal v Director of Public
Prosecutions [2015] UKSC 49, [2016] AC 88, at [93] and [102]. In that last paragraph,
Lord Kerr said that:
“A power on which there are insufficient legal constraints does
not become legal simply because those who may have resort to
it exercise self-restraint. It is the potential reach of the power
rather than its actual use by which its legality must be judged.”
(Emphasis added)
60.
Apart from the fact that Lord Kerr’s was a dissenting judgment, there is always a danger
of reading what a judge says in a particular case as if it were a provision of general
application in a statute. We do not accept that, in the present case, it is either necessary
or helpful to consider hypothetical scenarios which may arise in the future, as Mr
Squires urged us to do. We consider that what must be examined is the particular
interference with Article 8 rights which has arisen in this present case and in particular
whether that interference is in accordance with the law. Whether other uses of police
power in other contexts will be lawful in the future will be a matter to be considered if
the facts of such a case arise in practice. This is consistent with the approach of the