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To give the Investigatory Powers Tribunal set up under section 65 of RIPA
all such assistance as the Tribunal may require for the purpose of enabling
them to carry out their functions under that section.
Discharge of my functions
6. Section 57(2) of RIPA provides that as the Interception of Communications
Commissioner I shall keep under review:
(a)
the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State of the power and
duties conferred or imposed on him by or under sections 1 to 11;
(b) the exercise and performance, by the persons on whom they are conferred
or imposed, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under
Chapter II of Part I;
(c)
the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State in relation to
information obtained under Part I of the powers and duties conferred or
imposed on him by or under Part III; and
(d) the adequacy of the arrangements by virtue of which:
(i)
the duty which is imposed on the Secretary of State by section 15; and
(ii) so far as is applicable to information obtained under Part I, the duties
imposed by section 55 are sought to be discharged.
7. These sections in RIPA set out the formal position of the post of the
Commissioner for Interception of Communications. I work within that statutory
context but the role is somewhat wider than that. It is not easy to summarise my
role in short form, but essentially I see the role of Commissioner as encompassing
these primary headings:
(a)
To protect people in the United Kingdom from any unlawful intrusion of
their privacy. This is provided for by Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. I must be diligent to ensure that this does not happen, and
alert to ensure that there are systems in place so that this does not and cannot
happen. Over the long period that I have held my present post, I have found
no evidence whatsoever of any desire within the Intelligence or the Law
Enforcement Agencies in this field to act wrongfully or unlawfully. On the
contrary, I have found a palpable desire on the part of all these Agencies to
ensure that they do act completely within the four walls of the law. To this
end, they welcome the oversight of the Commissioner and over the years
have frequently sought my advice on issues that have arisen, and they have
invariably accepted it. In any event, I believe that the legislation together
with the safeguards and Codes of Practice that are in place make it
technically virtually impossible to deliberately intercept a citizen’s
communications unlawfully with intent to avoid legal requirements.
(b) To assist the Agencies to do the work entrusted to them and, bearing in mind
the number of organisations that I am now required to oversee, this occurs
quite frequently. My work is, of course, limited to the legal as opposed to
the operational aspects of their work. They take great care with their work
and I have been impressed by its quality.
(c)
To ensure that proper safeguards and Codes of Practice are in place to
protect the public and the Agencies themselves. These have to be approved
by the Secretaries of State. But every Secretary of State with whom I have
worked has required to be informed as to whether the Commissioner has
approved them before he or she is willing to do so.
(d) To advise Ministers, and Government Departments, in relation to issues
arising on the interception of communications, the acquisition and
disclosure of communications data, to approve the safeguards documents
and the Codes of Practice.
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