2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
Section 7
Prisons
7.1
In this section I shall provide an outline of the legislation governing the
interception of prisoners’ communications, give details of our prison inspection regime
and summarise the key findings from our inspections.
Background
7.2
I have continued to provide non-statutory oversight of the interception of
communications in prisons in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as did my predecessors.
I do not currently provide any oversight for prisons in Scotland. It would be preferable, in
my view, if prison oversight was formalised as a statutory function.
7.3
This non statutory oversight of prisons in England and Wales commenced in 2002
at the request of the then Home Secretary. IOCCO were invited to undertake inspections
of the Northern Ireland Prisons by the then Director General of Northern Ireland Prisons
in 2008.
7.4
In England and Wales Function 4 of the National Security Framework (NSF)
governs the procedures for the interception of prisoners’ communications (telephone
calls and mail). There are also various Prison Service Instructions (PSIs) (such as 08/2009,
52/2010, 49/2011, 56/2011, 24/2012, 10/2013) that impact on this area. The numerous
policy documents are fragmented and contradictory in places and this makes it difficult
for the prisons themselves to understand the requirements fully and for our inspectors
to conduct the oversight. Our inspectors have, on more than one occasion, come across
new PSIs whilst actually inspecting prisons. This is problematic as in these instances
we had not had the opportunity to align our inspection baselines to the new policy.
Concerns have been raised with the Security Group, National Offender Management
Service (NOMS) as to why we were not notified in advance of the implementation dates
of PSIs that affect the arrangements for the interception of prisoners’ communications.
7.5
NOMS is working towards implementing an Interception PSI and it was our
understanding that this PSI would replace all other PSIs. It is not clear whether this is
still the intention. In our view it would be very confusing for the establishments who
are trying to introduce systems and procedures to comply with the various policies if
there are numerous PSIs covering this activity and a lack of clarity over which PSI takes
precedence.
7.6
Last year my predecessor reported that NOMS had not formally introduced the
interception risk assessment template that was designed in 2011. So far as I am aware,
there has again been no progress here. Our inspectors have found themselves in a difficult
position whereby they are effectively being asked to promote the use of templates which
have not been formally ratified.
7.7
NOMS must get to grips with these issues and put in place a clear defined policy
and risk assessment documents for the interception of prisoners’ communications.
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