2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
7. How can the public feel comfortable in the matter of interception when
everything is secret and the public does not know and cannot find out what
the interception agencies are doing?
6.7.1
This is an entirely legitimate question. As I have said there are two problems.
6.7.2 First, RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter I is difficult legislation and a reader’s eyes glaze
over before reaching the end of section 1, that is, if the reader ever starts. The Codes of
Practice are more accessible and contain a fairly readable account of the requirements
and constraints.
6.7.3 I have given in this report a detailed summary and analysis of the relevant
legislation which is intended to be accessible. It sets out to show what the statute permits
and what is does not permit. I have tried to be helpful and to set right misunderstandings
where I reckon these exist. If the informed public can understand the main shape of the
legislation, that should supply part of the comfort. The main shape of the legislation is
that it is derived from and fully compliant with Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention;
and that interception cannot lawfully take place except by procedures and subject to
safeguards designed to achieve that compliance. The starting point is that interception
can only be lawfully undertaken for one of the statutory purposes derived from Article 8.
6.7.4 Second, although there is no escaping the statutory constraints on publishing
sensitive details about what the interception agencies do in detail, their interception
activities are directed, and only directed, in the national interest towards the statutory
necessity purposes. I have been able to publish where possible details of what the
interception agencies do not do, which I hope may help. In the end, there has to be a fair
degree of trust, both of the interception agencies themselves, and of the extent to which
I and my office are properly able to review the interception agencies RIPA 2000 Part I
activities in the public interest.
6.7.5 I am, however, personally quite clear that any member of the public who does not
associate with potential terrorists or serious criminals or individuals who are potentially
involved in actions which could raise national security issues for the UK can be assured that
none of the interception agencies which I inspect has the slightest interest in examining
their emails, their phone or postal communications or their use of the internet, and they
do not do so to any extent which could reasonably be regarded as significant.
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