2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
see that either of these by themselves affect the integrity of the statutory structure as
supplemented by the Code of Practice.
6.5.48 Privacy and Human Rights. As I have already noted, one of the main reasons
for Parliament enacting RIPA 2000 was to make it compliant with the Human Rights
Act 1998. Thus RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter I, and the section 8(4) procedures in particular,
were enacted as being compliant with the privacy rights in Article 8 of the Convention.
There is no reason internal to the statute to suppose that they are any less compliant
as statutory provisions now than they were in 2000. No doubt Parliament addressed
particular human rights privacy considerations as well in 2000, and it is appropriate to
re-address such considerations now with reference to section 8(4).
6.5.49 Since the section 8(4) structure re-enacted in 2000 explicitly enables the
generalised initial interception of what at the point of interception is (relatively) unfiltered
material, the following questions might arise:
(a) is it in general necessary and proportionate to warrant the initial interception of
this kind and volume of material?
(b) are there other reasonable less intrusive means of obtaining the information
which it is considered necessary to obtain – this is a consideration which section
5(4) of RIPA 2000 explicitly requires the Secretary of State to take into account?
(c) is there a risk that a process of generalised initial interception would unavoidably
also initially intercept some internal communications?
6.5.50 The question at (a) above cannot be properly answered as an isolated question.
The necessity and proportionality of the initial interception has to be looked at in the
context of:
•
•
•
•
•
what then happens to the interception material;
to what extent may it be lawfully examined;
for how long and for what purpose is it retained before being deleted;
what safeguards are imposed by the statute; and
are the safeguards adhered to?
I have considered each of these matters in the course of this report.
6.5.51 As to (b) above, I am satisfied that at present there are no other reasonable means
that would enable the interception agencies to have access to external communications
which the Secretary of State judges it is necessary for them to obtain for a statutory
purpose under the section 8(4) procedure. This is a sensitive matter of considerable
technical complexity which I have investigated in detail.
6.5.52 As to (c) above, I am satisfied from extensive practical and technical information
provided to me that it is not at the moment technically feasible to intercept external
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