2013 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
should be more scrupulous in applying for the cancellation of a warrant which is no
longer necessary for a statutory purpose. In almost all such instances the cancellation
is a paper formality (albeit a statutory necessity), because the actual interception will
have been stopped by technical intervention. But I have regarded these necessary formal
cancellations as important. Otherwise there is a rather greater risk of error (as in fact
happened in at least one instance during the year).
3.46 I made recommendations to ensure that the required procedures for the handling
of confidential privileged material are properly observed. There are detailed requirements
on this subject in Chapter 3 of the Interception of Communications Code of Practice,
which include the circumstances in which the interception of confidential privileged
material have to be brought to my attention.
3.47 My impression is that the interception agencies and the Secretaries of State
appreciate the inspection reports. We shall continue to issue them and in the process
refine their form and content. A large number of the recommendations have already
been addressed by the interception agencies or Secretary of State departments or, if not,
I have been assured that work is underway to achieve them. Some require changes to
systems and processes which will take time to achieve. I will check progress during my
first round of 2014 inspections.
Retention, Storage and Destruction of intercepted
material and related communications data
3.48 I decided soon after I was appointed to conduct a detailed investigation into the
arrangements for Retention, Storage and Destruction of intercepted material and related
communications data by each of the 9 interception agencies. I decided to do this, as it
happened, before the media disclosures started, because it seemed to me to be relevant
generally to compliance with the statutory safeguards. The formal requests were made
afterwards in August 2013 and with an eye to some of the disclosures. This investigation
was in addition to my routine inspections of these agencies.
3.49 My request for information. I sent a common letter to each of the 9 interception
agencies. This asked them to provide full and systematically organised information about
the Retention, Storage and Destruction of the product of interception for all relevant
interception operations. I asked for particular reference to every database in which
intercepted material and related communications data is stored.
3.50 My letter required the interception agencies to have an eye to section 15(3) of
RIPA 2000, which provides:
“The requirements of this subsection are satisfied in relation to the intercepted
material and any related communications data if each copy, made of any of
the material or data (if not destroyed earlier) is destroyed as soon as there are
no longer any grounds for retaining it as necessary for any of the authorised
purposes.”
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