52
KENNEDY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
cited above), any person who suspects that his communications have been
or are being intercepted may apply to the IPT (see paragraph 76 above). The
jurisdiction of the IPT does not, therefore, depend on notification to the
interception subject that there has been an interception of his
communications. The Court emphasises that the IPT is an independent and
impartial body, which has adopted its own rules of procedure. The members
of the tribunal must hold or have held high judicial office or be experienced
lawyers (see paragraph 75 above). In undertaking its examination of
complaints by individuals, the IPT has access to closed material and has the
power to require the Commissioner to provide it with any assistance it
thinks fit and the power to order disclosure by those involved in the
authorisation and execution of a warrant of all documents it considers
relevant (see paragraph 78 above). In the event that the IPT finds in the
applicant's favour, it can, inter alia, quash any interception order, require
destruction of intercept material and order compensation to be paid (see
paragraph 80 above). The publication of the IPT's legal rulings further
enhances the level of scrutiny afforded to secret surveillance activities in the
United Kingdom (see paragraph Error! Reference source not found.
above).
168. Finally, the Court observes that the reports of the Commissioner
scrutinise any errors which have occurred in the operation of the legislation.
In his 2007 report, the Commissioner commented that none of the breaches
or errors identified were deliberate and that, where interception had, as a
consequence of human or technical error, unlawfully taken place, any
intercept material was destroyed as soon as the error was discovered (see
paragraph 73 above). There is therefore no evidence that any deliberate
abuse of interception powers is taking place.
169. In the circumstances, the Court considers that the domestic law on
interception of internal communications together with the clarifications
brought by the publication of the Code indicate with sufficient clarity the
procedures for the authorisation and processing of interception warrants as
well as the processing, communicating and destruction of intercept material
collected. The Court further observes that there is no evidence of any
significant shortcomings in the application and operation of the surveillance
regime. On the contrary, the various reports of the Commissioner have
highlighted the diligence with which the authorities implement RIPA and
correct any technical or human errors which accidentally occur (see
paragraphs 62, 67, 71 and 73 above). Having regard to the safeguards
against abuse in the procedures as well as the more general safeguards
offered by the supervision of the Commissioner and the review of the IPT,
the impugned surveillance measures, insofar as they may have been applied
to the applicant in the circumstances outlined in the present case, are
justified under Article 8 § 2.