50
KENNEDY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
(see paragraph 55 above). The Court concludes that the provisions on
duration, renewal and cancellation are sufficiently clear.
162. As regards the procedure for examining, using and storing the data,
the Government indicated in their submissions that, under RIPA, an
intercepting agency could, in principle, listen to all intercept material
collected (see paragraph 144 above). The Court recalls its conclusion in
Liberty and Others, cited above, § 65, that the authorities' discretion to
capture and listen to captured material was very wide. However, that case,
unlike the present case, involved external communications, in respect of
which data were captured indiscriminately. Contrary to the practice under
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 concerning external
communications, interception warrants for internal communications under
RIPA relate to one person or one set of premises only (cf. Liberty and
Others, cited above, § 64), thereby limiting the scope of the authorities'
discretion to intercept and listen to private communications. Moreover, any
captured data which are not necessary for any of the authorised purposes
must be destroyed.
163. As to the general safeguards which apply to the processing and
communication of intercept material, the Court observes that section 15
RIPA imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that arrangements
are in place to secure any data obtained from interception and contains
specific provisions on communication of intercept material (see
paragraph 42 above). Further details of the arrangements are provided by
the Code. In particular, the Code strictly limits the number of persons to
whom intercept material can be disclosed, imposing a requirement for the
appropriate level of security clearance as well as a requirement to
communicate data only where there is a “need to know”. It further clarifies
that only so much of the intercept material as the individual needs to know
is to be disclosed and that where a summary of the material would suffice,
then only a summary should be disclosed. The Code requires intercept
material, as well as copies and summaries of such material, to be handled
and stored securely to minimise the risk of threat or loss. In particular, it
must be inaccessible to those without the necessary security clearance (see
paragraphs 46 to 47 above). A strict procedure for security vetting is in
place (see paragraph 48 above). In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied
that the provisions on processing and communication of intercept material
provide adequate safeguards for the protection of data obtained.
164. As far as the destruction of intercept material is concerned,
section 15(3) RIPA requires that the intercept material and any related
communications data, as well as any copies made of the material or data,
must be destroyed as soon as there are no longer any grounds for retaining
them as necessary on section 5(3) grounds (see paragraph 42 above). The
Code stipulates that intercept material must be reviewed at appropriate