48
KENNEDY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
sufficient detail should be provided of the nature of the offences in question.
In the case of RIPA, section 5 provides that interception can only take place
where the Secretary of State believes that it is necessary in the interests of
national security, for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime
or for the purposes of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom (see paragraphs 31 to 32 above). The applicant criticises the terms
“national security” and “serious crime” as being insufficiently clear. The
Court disagrees. It observes that the term “national security” is frequently
employed in both national and international legislation and constitutes one
of the legitimate aims to which Article 8 § 2 itself refers. The Court has
previously emphasised that the requirement of “foreseeability” of the law
does not go so far as to compel States to enact legal provisions listing in
detail all conduct that may prompt a decision to deport an individual on
“national security” grounds. By the nature of things, threats to national
security may vary in character and may be unanticipated or difficult to
define in advance (Al-Nashif, cited above, § 121). Similar considerations
apply to the use of the term in the context of secret surveillance. Further,
additional clarification of how the term is to be applied in practice in the
United Kingdom has been provided by the Commissioner, who has
indicated that it allows surveillance of activities which threaten the safety or
well-being of the State and activities which are intended to undermine or
overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means
(see paragraph 33 above). As for “serious crime”, this is defined in the
interpretative provisions of the Act itself and what is meant by “detecting”
serious crime is also explained in the Act (see paragraphs 34 to 35 above).
The Court is of the view that the reference to serious crime, together with
the interpretative clarifications in the Act, gives citizens an adequate
indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which
public authorities are empowered to resort to secret surveillance measures.
The Court therefore considers that, having regard to the provisions of RIPA,
the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order is
sufficiently clear (compare and contrast Iordachi and Others, cited above,
§ 46).
160. The Court observes that under RIPA, it is possible for the
communications of any person in the United Kingdom to be intercepted.
However, it should be recalled that, in contrast to the Liberty and Others
case which concerned the legislation on interception of communications
between the United Kingdom and any other country, the present case
concerns internal communications, i.e. communications within the United
Kingdom. Further, the legislation must describe the categories of persons
who, in practice, may have their communications intercepted. In this
respect, the Court observes that there is an overlap between the condition
that the categories of persons be set out and the condition that the nature of
the offences be clearly defined. The relevant circumstances which can give