KENNEDY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
43
listen to all intercepted material in order to determine whether it contained
valuable intelligence, where it contained no such intelligence the material
would be swiftly and securely destroyed. Section 15 RIPA provided an
exhaustive definition of the “authorised purposes” and, in particular,
section 15(4) identified limits on the number of persons to whom intercept
material could be disclosed (see paragraph 42 above). These provisions
were supplemented by the provisions of chapter 6 of the Code (see
paragraphs 45 to 47 above). In particular, paragraph 6.4 of the Code
specified that disclosure could only be made to persons with security
clearance and paragraph 6.9 provided for distribution lists of vetted persons
to be maintained. Disclosure was further limited by the “need-to-know”
principle, which restricted both those who could gain access to intercept
material and the extent of any such access. Paragraph 6.5 of the Code
clarified that the obligation not to disclose intercept information applied to
any person to whom such information had been disclosed. Any breach of
these safeguards was an offence under section 19 RIPA (see paragraph 44
above). The requirement to keep records in respect of the making,
distribution and destruction of intercept material also provided an important
safeguard. Section 15(3) made it clear that intercept material had to be
destroyed as soon as there were no longer grounds for retaining it as
“necessary” for any of the exhaustively defined authorised purposes. Where
human or technical error had resulted in material being gathered where it
should not have been, the intercept material was immediately destroyed.
Finally, where intercept material was retained, paragraph 6.8 of the Code
required it to be reviewed at appropriate intervals to ensure that the
justification for its retention remained valid.
145. The Government emphasised that information concerning the
arrangements put in place under section 15 RIPA had been published in the
Code. However, in order to maintain the operational effectiveness of
interception techniques, it was not possible to publish full details of the
arrangements. In the view of the Government, the publication of any more
detail than had already been published would be contrary to national
security and prejudicial to the prevention and detection of serious crime.
They argued that the decision as to how much information on safeguards
could safely be put in the public domain without undermining the interests
of national security or prejudicing the prevention and detection of serious
crime fell within their margin of appreciation. It was also significant that the
full details of the arrangements in place were made available to the
Commissioner, who was required to keep them under review. The
Government emphasised that the Commissioner's approval was sought and
given in respect of the safeguard documents either before or shortly after the
entry into force of RIPA (see paragraph 63 above). They further emphasised
that the Commissioner had expressed his satisfaction with the section 15
safeguards in every report prepared since 2000. They referred in particular