5.52.
Those conclusions were in line with those that have been reached by the IOCC
and the ISC: 3.87(a) above. Insofar as they relate (at least) to the “strong
selector” process described at 2.19(a) above, they are in line also with the
conclusions of the PCLOB on the analogous s702 power. They further conform
to the assessment of former intelligence professionals whose experience is more
recent and more UK-focused than that of William Binney (who I accept takes a
different view): 3.72-3.77 above.
5.53.
This Review has given me the opportunity to revisit my earlier conclusion with
the help of Review team members skilled respectively in technology, in complex
investigations and in the interrogation of intelligence personnel, and on the basis
of considerably more evidence: notably, a variety of well-evidenced case studies,
internal documentation and the statistic that almost half of GCHQ’s intelligence
reporting is based on data obtained under bulk intelligence warrants.
5.54.
My opinion can be summarised as follows:
(a) The bulk interception power has proven itself to be of vital utility across the
range of GCHQ’s operational areas, including counter-terrorism in the UK
and abroad, cyber-defence, child sexual exploitation, organised crime and
the support of military operations.
(b) The power has been of value in target discovery but also in target
development, the triaging of leads and as a basis for disruptive action. It has
played an important part, for example, in the prevention of bomb attacks, the
rescue of a hostage and the thwarting of numerous cyber-attacks.
(c) While the principal value of the power lies in the collection of secondary data,
the collection and analysis of content have also been of very great utility,
particularly in assessing the intentions and plans of targets, sometimes in
crucial situations.
(d) The various suggested alternatives, alone or in combination, may be useful
in individual cases but fall short of matching the results that can be achieved
using the bulk interception capability. They may also be slower, more
expensive, more intrusive or riskier to life
5.55.
All that said, there are signs that outside the field of cyber-defence, where bulk
interception is of crucial importance (5.4(c) above), trends towards universal
encryption and the anonymisation of devices may be making the bulk
interception power into a (gently) diminishing asset. The need for future
decision-makers in this field to be fully apprised of the technical picture is
addressed, in the context of each of the powers under review, at 9.16-9.32
below.
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