interception and the interception of an incorrect communications address. In one
very serious incident in 2014, an individual who deliberately undertook a number
of unauthorised searches for related communications data had his employment
terminated and vetting status withdrawn. But none of the errors was of such a
nature as to throw into doubt the utility of the bulk interception power. Nor were
they suggestive of an unduly casual approach: the IOCC, while noting that there
was room for improvement, spoke of the SIAs’ “strong culture of compliance and
of self-reporting when things go wrong”.210
5.43.
The SIAs make little attempt precisely to assess the extent to which the use of
bulk interception achieves or fails to achieve the desired goal. Managers from all
SIAs emphasised that, if an analyst’s search does not provide the required
answers, then further searches will be conducted until success is achieved. It
was said to be very rare for any outcome to be achieved through the use of bulk
powers (or any one bulk power) alone. Success rates were therefore difficult to
measure. I had the impression that the utility of bulk interception may have
seemed so self-evident to the SIAs that they had not seen a need to assess its
value or failure rate.
Internal documents
5.44.
At the outset of the Review I expressed a wish (as noted at 1.34 and 4.32-4.33
above) to see documents internal to the SIAs, including documents prepared for
the purposes of frank internal reflection rather than the achievement of a desired
outcome such as a funding increase or the grant of a warrant.
5.45.
In relation to bulk interception, the Review team was shown a substantial
quantity of GCHQ documents, some going back to 2003. These documents
provided me with an overview of the development of bulk interception, with an
initial focus on content, subsequently broadened to include communications
data.
210
5.46.
Among other documents, we saw a series of annual and quarterly performance
reports, intended for internal use. Those reports show that bulk interception was
seen within GCHQ as underpinning much of its successful work. Bulk
interception remained of value, despite the increasing use of encryption, and was
noted to be particularly important in enabling target discovery and in pattern
analysis.
5.47.
Another document, which admittedly (and as GCHQ pointed out to us) was
created in November 2015 for submission during a spending round, corroborated
what we had heard from front-line analysts about the advantages of bulk
Ibid., p.42.
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