context they provide will be available for analysis only if they were previously
collected.”168
3.70.
It also concluded that “other sources of information might provide a partial
substitute for bulk collection in some circumstances”, referring in this regard to
targeted collection, to the interrogation of bulk data held by CSPs, and to other
intelligence sources and methods. But the NAS was clear that none could be a
complete substitute, commenting that:
“Data retained from targeted SIGINT collection might be a partial substitute if
the needed information was in fact collected. Bulk data held by other parties
might substitute to some extent, but this relies on those parties retaining the
information until it is needed, as well as the ability of intelligence agencies to
collect or access it in an efficient and timely fashion. Other intelligence
sources and methods might also be able to supply some of the lost
information, but the committee was not charged to and did not investigate the
full range of such alternatives. Note that these alternatives may introduce
their own privacy and civil liberties concerns.”169
3.71.
The NAS Report went on to recommend improved controls on the usage of data
collected in bulk, to help enforce privacy protections and facilitate compliance
auditing.170
(7) Assessment of former intelligence professionals
3.72.
William Binney’s criticisms of bulk capabilities have commanded widespread
attention because, prior to his retirement in 2001, he worked as a technical
director at the NSA.
3.73.
In evidence to the Joint Bill Committee, he accepted the utility (for example in
missing persons investigations) of telephone and ICR records being retained by
CSPs for a six-month period so that targeted searches could be addressed to
them. But he expressed the view that bulk collection “applies no intelligence or
targeting at the point of collection” and “inundates analysts with too much data”,
causing them to “lose focus”. His solution was “smart collection”: “a focused
disciplined professional selection of meaningful data from the flow around the
world”, filtering either at the point of collection or subsequently so as to exclude
useless material.
3.74.
Mr Binney considered that “bulk data overcollection from Internet and telephony
networks undermines security and has consistently resulted in loss of life in my
country and elsewhere, from the 9/11 attacks to date”. Pressed as to why the
NSA and GCHQ would have invested so heavily in techniques which were
168
169
170
NAS Report, section 4.3 p. 57.
NAS Report, section 4.3, pp 57-58.
NAS Report, chapter 5: “Controlling Usage of Collected Data”.
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