3.11.
The IOCC also gave detailed reasons for concluding that the s8(4) process for
bulk interception “does not have a significant risk of undue invasion of
privacy”.126 He described as “a matter of policy” the question of whether the
SIAs should continue to be enabled to intercept external communications in
order to assist their functions of protecting the nation and its citizens, but
expressed the personal view that it was “obvious” that they should.
3.12.
As to bulk acquisition, IOCCO published a report in July 2016 setting out the
findings of its first review of the use of section 94 directions to acquire bulk
communications data. The purpose of IOCCO’s review was to identify the extent
to which the SIAs use section 94 directions, to assess what a comprehensive
oversight and audit function of section 94 directions would look like and to
assess whether the systems and procedures in place for section 94 directions
are sufficient to comply with the legislation and any relevant policies. As such the
review report does not focus specifically on utility, although it does contains one
indication of it. The section entitled “The operational case for bulk
communications data being acquired and retained by the agencies” (8.27-8.32)
notes the existence of this Review and comments (at 8.29) that:
“It is clear from our oversight that access to bulk communications data
retained by the agencies pursuant to section 94 directions enables more
complex analysis to be undertaken which would not be possible through a
series of individual requests [to CSPs] made under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of
RIPA.”
3.13.
To summarise, implicit in IOCCO’s function is the examination of the utility to be
obtained from bulk interception and acquisition.127 Whilst it has never had to
address itself explicitly to the subject-matter of this Review:
(a) It may be inferred from IOCCO’s reviews of the lawfulness of bulk
interception (including its necessity) that successive IOCCs have considered
that power to be a useful one.
(b) The IOCC expressed satisfaction in his report of April 2014, after detailed
technical examination, that there were no reasonable alternatives to bulk
interception.
(c) The utility of the bulk acquisition power for the purposes of complex analysis
not possible under other powers was noted in the IOCC’s report of July 2016.
126
127
Ibid.,. 6.5.43. See also 6.6.2: “The interception agencies do not engage in indiscriminate
random mass intrusion by misusing their powers under RIPA 2000 Part I. It would be
comprehensively unlawful if they did.”
The Bill extends the statutory oversight function of the existing Commissioners by including an
explicit provision for the IPC to report on the results of the use of the powers, including their
impact: clause 210(2)(b).
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