EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•
This Report evaluates the operational case for four of the powers in the
Investigatory Powers Bill currently before Parliament: bulk interception,
bulk acquisition, bulk equipment interference and bulk personal datasets.
These powers can be used only by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.
•
It provides a full introduction to each of the powers (chapter 2) and notes
the generally favourable conclusions of those security-cleared persons
who have in the past commented on their utility (chapter 3).
•
The security-cleared Review team comprised technical, investigatory and
legal experts. We consulted widely. Each member of the Review team
authorises me to say that they are in agreement with the conclusions of
this Report and with my recommendation (1.28-1.55).
•
The Review applied itself in particular (chapter 4) to:
o
some 60 detailed case studies provided by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ,
together with associated intelligence reports,
o
internal documents from each of the Agencies, in which the utility of
the powers was discussed, and
o
the questioning of some 85 intelligence officials, including on
whether other methods could have achieved the same results.
•
The Report concludes that there is a proven operational case for three of
the bulk powers, and that there is a distinct (though not yet proven)
operational case for bulk equipment interference (9.12-9.15).
•
As the case studies show, the bulk powers are used across the range of
Agency activity, from cyber-defence, counter-espionage and counterterrorism to child sexual abuse and organised crime (Annexes 8-11).
•
The bulk powers play an important part in identifying, understanding and
averting threats in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and further afield. Where
alternative methods exist, they are often less effective, more dangerous,
more resource-intensive, more intrusive or slower (chapters 5-8).
•
The Review was not asked to reach conclusions as to the proportionality or
desirability of the bulk powers. As the terms of reference for the Review
made clear, these are matters for Parliament (1.10-1.14).
•
The Report makes a single recommendation: that a Technical Advisory
Panel of independent academics and industry experts be appointed by the
Investigatory Powers Commission to advise on the impact of changing
technology, and on how MI5, MI6 and GCHQ could reduce the privacy
footprint of their activities (9.16-9.31).
•
Though it found that the bulk powers have a clear operational purpose, the
Report accepts that technological changes will provoke new questions.
Adoption of its Recommendation will enable such questions to be asked,
and answered, on a properly informed basis (9.32).
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