“Bulk personal datasets comprise personal data relating to a number of
individuals, the majority of whom are unlikely to be of intelligence interest.
The security and intelligence agencies hold the data electronically and
analysts will only look at the data relating to the minority who are of
intelligence interest. The security and intelligence agencies do this by asking
specific questions of the data to retrieve information of intelligence value.”
2.71.
Examples of specific BPDs given in the Operational Case include the passport
register, the electoral register, the telephone directory and data about individuals
with access to firearms. The categories disclosed to the IPT were:
(a) Law enforcement/intelligence: datasets containing operationally focused
information from law enforcement or other intelligence agencies;
(b) Travel: datasets containing information which enables the identification of
individuals’ travel activity;
(c) Communications: datasets allowing the identification of individuals where the
basis of information held is primarily related to communications data, e.g. a
telephone directory;
(d) Finance: datasets allowing the identification of finance-related activity of
individuals;
(e) Population: datasets providing population data or other information which
could be used to help identify individuals, e.g. passport details; and
(f) Commercial: datasets providing details of corporations / individuals involved
in commercial activities.
BPDs generally contain basic biographical details on individuals that will
correspond to the definition of “identifying data”. Dominic Grieve QC MP, Chair of
the ISC which like the Review team saw the complete list of datasets, described
some of them as “pretty mundane”.109 A small proportion contain material that is
comparable to the content of communications as defined in the Bill.
2.72.
The draft Code of Practice states:
“The [Bill] does not create any new power to obtain BPDs. Rather it requires
that the retention and use of BPDs must be subject to an authorisation
scheme and a comprehensive set of robust and transparent safeguards.
Specifically, [clause 183 of the Bill] provides that a [SIA] may not exercise a
109
Hansard HC, 7 June, vol 611 col 1064.
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