covers, it is nevertheless targeted since the selectors used relate to
individual targets”.66
(b) The “complex query” process (2015 ISC report paras 65-73) is used
where GCHQ is looking to match much more complicated criteria, for
example with three or four elements. This process operates across a far
smaller number of bearers. These bearers are not chosen at random, as
GCHQ focuses its resources on those most likely to carry communications of
intelligence value. As a first step in the processing under this method the
system applies an initial set of processing rules. Those rules seek to select
communications of potential intelligence value while discarding those least
likely to be of intelligence value. The selected communications are not
available to GCHQ staff to search through at will. Further complex searches
draw out the communications of intelligence value. By performing searches
combining a number of criteria, the odds of a 'false positive' are considerably
reduced.
This second process is closer to true bulk interception, since it involves the
collection of unselected content and/or secondary data. It permits types of
analysis and selection that are not currently achievable in the near real-time
environment of the strong selector process (2.19(a) above). But as with the
first process, it remains the case that communications unlikely to be of
intelligence value are discarded as soon as that becomes apparent.
2.20.
The ISC March 2015 Report rejected allegations of untargeted or blanket
surveillance, concluding at para 64 that:
“This interception process does not therefore collect communications
indiscriminately”
and at para 77 that:
“Only the communications of suspected criminals or national security targets
are deliberately selected for examination.”
I have no reason to disagree with those assessments, though it is outside the
scope of my functions and of this Review to conduct a detailed examination of
GCHQ’s collection and selection processes. Such examinations are conducted
by technically skilled inspectors in the IOCC’s Office [IOCCO] (see 3.5(a) below)
and will in future be conducted by the IPC.
66
2015 ISC Report, para 64. The analogous power in the USA was described as a targeted
power by the PCLOB: 3.53(b) below. Liberty, in its submission to the Review of 31 July 2016
(para 17), refers to the product of filtering which relates to targets – as is, in practice, it always
does - as “a rich store of targeted data”. It is not clear therefore that Liberty actually objects to
GCHQ’s use of the strong selector process, despite the fact that for the purposes of the Bill it is
classed as a bulk interception capability. This affects Liberty’s analysis e.g. at para 42.
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