been possible to give only a flavour of the detailed classified material that has led
me to those conclusions. Nonetheless, I believe that this Report constitutes the
fullest assessment of the powers under review that has been published to date.
1.57.
This report contains a number of matters that it was not open to me to disclose at
the time of AQOT.48 But effective intelligence work relies on its targets being
uncertain as to precisely how such powers are used. There are dangers,
including to the safety of the population, in disclosing sensitive tradecraft.
1.58.
The requirement in RIPA 2000 s19 to keep secret many matters relating to
interception warrants has further limited what can be said publicly, including in
case studies.49 This has not always deterred those seeking to relate the case
studies to actual events.50 I have pressed SIAs and others for the fullest
possible public disclosure of sensitive material. But like others who have
reviewed the current and anticipated future operational utility of sensitive
intelligence techniques, I have had to acknowledge the often frustrating reality
that there are limits to what I can explain or clarify in a public document.
1.59.
In accordance with my terms of reference, this report has been submitted for fact
and security checking prior to publication. Some relatively minor changes were
called for as a consequence of that process, whose purpose is to minimise
inaccuracy and ensure that no inadvertent disclosures are made of a kind that
could damage national security. No pressure was exerted on me to alter any
views expressed in this Report, and any attempt to do so would have been
rejected without hesitation.
1.60.
The Review’s terms of reference give me the option of producing a classified
annex to this report, for the benefit of the Prime Minister and the ISC. I was
tempted: the Review team’s consideration of case studies in particular occupied
more time and effort than is apparent from the abbreviated summaries that I
have been constrained to give in this Report.51 But the purpose of this Report is
to inform the parliamentary and public debate on the Bill. Its conclusions
faithfully reflect my assessment of all the evidence I have seen. I concluded that
there would be little to be gained by the production of an annex that could not be
read by the intended audience for this Report.
48
49
50
51
Just as AQOT included material (e.g. its Annex 9) to which previous reports, including the 2015
ISC Report, had been unable to refer.
Clauses 54 and 123 of the Bill contain similar prohibitions.
See, e.g., Sean O’Neill, “GCHQ data harvesting led to drone strike on 7/7 chief”, The Times, 13
June 2015, in which he sought to decode the case studies in AQOT Annex 9.
Chapters 5-8 and Annexes 8-11 below.
19