In this example, a specific identifier (the selector unique to the anonymisation
package) which is connected directly to the cell members is known from the outset.
Accordingly, despite the precise identities of the individuals being unknown, the
Secretary of State:
•
knows and can fully assess all of the interferences with privacy that will occur
(both in relation to the cell members and innocent individuals whose devices
will be affected) from the start to the end of the operation;
•
knows what will happen at the beginning of the operation to collect the initial
‘pot’ of data; and
•
knows, to a high degree of certainty given the specific identifier that will be
applied to that ‘pot’, that the communications to be retrieved from the ‘pot’ and
examined will belong to the cell members.
As the cell members can be identified from their association to a specific,
known anonymisation package, a targeted ‘thematic’ warrant is suitable.
Example 2
By contrast with Example 1, little is known about the individual members of the
terrorist cell. No technical details are known about their communications or the
devices they are using. However, it is known that a particular software package is
commonly – but not exclusively – used by some terrorist groups.
An EI warrant is used to obtain a large volume of equipment data (not content) from a
large number of devices in the specified location in the Middle East. Using a specific
search term (a ‘selector’) related to the software package, data relating to the users
of the software package is retrieved from the ‘pot’ of data collected.
Analysts apply other search terms and analytical techniques to the data to find
common factors that indicate a terrorist connection. The results show that some
people from the original ‘pot’ (those using the software package associated with
terrorists) have also accessed a particular Internet Protocol (IP) address which is
known to be linked to an extremist website containing, among other things, a bombmaking manual. Using the newly discovered IP address, the original ‘pot’ of data is
searched again to find other devices that have also accessed the website. A series of
refined searches of this kind will gradually identify devices that belong to the terrorist
cell. Their communications (including content) can then be collected and examined.
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