points made to us by NGOs, technical experts and others listed at 1.51-1.53
below about the unintended consequences of the use of EI, its costeffectiveness, and the incidence of failed or unproductive operations. See
further 2.68(b) and 7.24-7.25 below.
1.40.
The human resources devoted to our visits to the SIAs, and to servicing our
requests, were as follows:
(a) During the team’s principal visit to MI5 we met with 19 MI5 officers; 52 were
involved in planning and preparing the visit, and by early July MI5 had
devoted more than 800 person hours to supporting the Review.
(b) During the team’s principal visit to MI6 we met with 11 people; around 30
were involved in planning and preparing the visit, and by early July MI6 had
spent around 130 person hours on preparation for and participation in the
Review. These lower figures reflect the fact that, aside from BPDs, MI6
currently relies on the other SIAs’ use of the bulk powers under review to
support its operations.
(c) During the team’s principal visit to GCHQ we met with 55 people, including
military officers and integrees from other parts of Government. At least a
further 75 staff were involved in planning and preparing the visit, and by early
July GCHQ had devoted more than 1340 hours to supporting the Review.
Significant further resources were devoted to the Review by all three SIAs
between early July and early August.
1.41.
Those figures give some idea of the importance that the SIAs attached to this
Review, and the effort that they put into servicing it. They are also a reminder
that effective oversight brings with it costs in terms of staff time, including the
time of senior management, front-line analysts and desk officers.
1.42.
Separately, I contacted and spoke with the Ethics Counsellor at GCHQ, and with
the Chair of one of the two Scientific Advisory Councils [SACs], external
committees of independent academics and industry experts that advise,
respectively, GCHQ and MI5/MI6.44
Contact with users of SIA intelligence
1.43.
44
It soon became apparent that even relatively sophisticated users of intelligence
provided by the SIAs tend not to know much about the techniques by which it
was obtained. For that reason, I concluded that there was little additional value
The existence of the SACs has not previously been public knowledge. They were avowed at
my request and with the consent of their respective Chairs (who, however, do not wish their
own identities to be made public). See further 9.30 below.
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