8.17.
MI6 made a similar point to the Review team about the effectiveness of BPDs in
respect of target development. Much may be learned about a person through the
interrogation of BPDs. The alternative to the use of BPDs may be the
interception of that individual’s communications, a far more intrusive method.
8.18.
Alternatives are frequently much slower. A11/6 involved the use of BPDs to
confirm the partial identities provided on 20,000 ISIL registration documents.
Identification using alternative means would inevitably have been a far more
laborious process, and might well not have provided as many confirmed
identities.
8.19.
BPDs are also used in the identification of anomalies: analysis of BPDs may lead
to the identification of patterns which reveal hostile activity. In this field, BPDs
enable an agency to spot such activity without even having the “seed” of
intelligence which is usually required to start such an investigation. In the
absence of such a seed, there is no alternative means to obtain the intelligence.
The identification of anomalies may lead to the discovery of hostile actors who
would not otherwise have come to the attention of the SIAs or police. A11/2
provides an example of pattern analysis leading to identification that would not
otherwise have occurred.
8.20.
A11/5 demonstrates the use of BPDs this year, by MI6 in partnership with MI5
and GCHQ, to identify individuals who posed a threat to the UK in the wake of
the Paris and Brussels attacks. The Review team was given information which
demonstrated that there was no viable alternative method by which these
individuals could have been identified.
8.21.
In its submission to the Review of 31 July 2016, Liberty suggests that the
acquisition of BPDs by the SIAs is a “new and radical development”
(inaccurately: 2.70 above), and claims that the SIAs can obtain through other
means the information that they need in respect of specific targets.
8.22.
Liberty argues, in particular, that even a “lone wolf” must be radicalised, obtain
weapons and come into contact with extremist material. It appears to be
contending that targeted surveillance of those with whom a lone operator comes
into contact will lead to his identification. That may be true in specific instances,
but depends entirely on the SIAs having knowledge of, and the resources to
monitor, those potential contacts.
8.23.
Liberty states that it is “highly likely” that an SIA in possession of a target
identifier will be able to identify the target by name, and will then be able to
deploy a range of targeted techniques against him. There will undoubtedly be
circumstances in which the SIAs may use targeted techniques against an
identifier and thereby discover the target’s name. But the Review team was
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