●
The methods utilised in the establishments for the interception of
telephone communications and postal communications.
●
A physical inspection of the interception of telephone communications
and the equipment utilised.
●
A physical inspection of the arrangements for the interception of postal
communications.
28. I was particularly concerned to ensure that all interception was carried out
lawfully and in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and the Prison Rules made under the Prison
Act 1952. Insofar as the Human Rights Act and Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 are concerned the primary responsibility for compliance with
the legislation lies with the police force making an application for the disclosure
of information obtained by means of interception.
29. After each visit I produced a brief individual report for the prison
Governor and Prison Service Headquarters detailing my findings. I do not
propose to go into any detail about these visits, or my findings, in this Annual
Report. However, it is worth mentioning that my overall impression following
the five visits is that the arrangements of interception in the establishments
inspected has highlighted a number of inconsistencies in the approach to
interception work in prisons, and that the Prison Rules are not always strictly
complied with. These are issues that will need to be addressed by the Prison
Service.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Northern
Ireland Office warrants
30. In paragraphs 10—12 of my predecessor’s 1995 Annual Report, he set out
the reasons for not disclosing the number of warrants issued by the Foreign
Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the main part of
the Report. I take this opportunity again to emphasise the important reasoning
behind this decision.
31. This practice is based on paragraph 121 of the Report of the Committee of
Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into the interception of communications
and chaired by Lord Birkett. The Birkett Committee thought that public
concern about interception might to some degree be allayed by the knowledge
of the actual extent to which interception had taken place. After carefully
considering the consequences of disclosure upon the effectiveness of
interception as a means of detection, they decided that it would be in the public
interest to publish figures showing the extent of interception, but to do so only
in a way which caused no damage to the public interest. They went on to say:
“We are strongly of the opinion that it would be wrong for figures to be
disclosed by the Secretary of State at regular or irregular intervals in the
future. It would greatly aid the operation of agencies hostile to the state if
they were able to estimate even approximately the extent of the interceptions
of communications for security purposes.”
32. Like my predecessors I am not persuaded that there is any serious risk in
the publication of the number of warrants issued by the Home Secretary and
the First Minister for Scotland. This information does not provide hostile
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