Judgment Approved by the court for handing down.
Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal
(e) equipment in more than one location, where the
interference is for the purpose of a single investigation or
operation;
(f) equipment which is being, or may be, used for the purposes
of a particular activity or activities of a particular description;
(g) equipment which is being, or may be, used to test, maintain
or develop capabilities relating to interference with equipment
for the purpose of obtaining communications, equipment data
or other information;
(h) equipment which is being, or may be, used for the training
of persons who carry out, or are likely to carry out, such
interference with equipment.”
17.
Notwithstanding the coming into force of these powers in the 2016 Act, Issue 4 decided
by the Tribunal in 2016, unlike Issue 9, is not of merely historical significance. Section
5 of the 1994 Act remains the governing regime in respect of:a)
covert entry and search of premises or goods
b)
interference with goods
c)
interference with intellectual property rights; and
d)
computer hacking where the aim is not to acquire data, but to destroy or
otherwise manipulate the functioning of electronic systems.
The Tribunal’s judgment on issue 4
18.
After referring to the submissions of Mr Jaffey QC for the Claimants, including his
reliance on 18th century authorities on general warrants to which we shall come later,
and to those of Mr Eadie QC (as he then was) for the Respondents, the Tribunal said:“37. Eighteenth century abhorrence of general warrants issued
without express statutory sanction is not in our judgment a useful
or permissible aid to construction of an express statutory power
given to a Service, one of whose principal functions is to further
the interests of UK national security, with particular reference to
defence and foreign policy. The words should be given their
natural meaning in the context in which they are set.
38. The issue as to whether the specification is sufficient in any
particular case will be dependent on the particular facts of that
case. The courts frequently have to determine such questions for
example in respect of a warrant under the Police Act 1997 s.93,
when the issues, by reference to the particular facts would be
fully aired in open. That is not possible in relation to a s.5
warrant, but it may still be subject to scrutiny by the Intelligence
Services Commissioner, by the ISC and, if and when a
complaint is made to this Tribunal, then by this Tribunal. But the