(b) the exercise and performance, by the persons on whom they are conferred
or imposed, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under
Chapter II of Part I;
(c)
the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State in relation to
information obtained under Part I of the powers and duties conferred or
imposed on him by or under Part III; and
(d) the adequacy of the arrangements by virtue of which:
(i)
the duty which is imposed on the Secretary of State by section 15; and
(ii) so far as is applicable to information obtained under Part I, the duties
imposed by section 55 are sought to be discharged.
6. Part III (sections 49 to 56, together with Schedule 2) of RIPA – which
provides for the disclosure of protected electronic data in an intelligible form or
for disclosure of the means to access to such data to make it intelligible – will
enter into force on 1st October 2007.
Part I Chapter I: Interception
7. I have decided to continue with the practice followed by my predecessors of
making twice yearly visits to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service,
Government Communications Headquarters, the Serious Organised Crime
Agency, the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, Strathclyde Police
(visited once in this reporting period), the Police Service for Northern Ireland, the
Northern Ireland Office, HM Revenue and Customs, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Scottish Executive (visited once in
this reporting period), and the Ministry of Defence. In short, I meet officers in the
agencies undertaking interception work and officials in the departments of the
Secretaries of State/Ministers which issue the warrants. Prior to each visit, I
obtain a complete list of warrants issued or renewed or cancelled since the
previous visit of either myself or Sir Swinton Thomas. I then select, largely at
random, a sample of warrants for inspection. In the course of my visit I satisfy
myself that those warrants fully meet the criteria of RIPA, that proper procedures
have been followed and that the relevant safeguards and Codes of Practice have
been followed. During each visit I review each of the files and the supporting
documents and discuss the cases with the officers concerned. I can, if I need to,
view the product of interception. It is of paramount importance to ensure that the
facts justified the use of interception in each case and that those concerned with
interception fully understand the safeguards and the Codes of Practice.
8. I have been impressed by the quality, dedication and enthusiasm of the
personnel carrying out this work. They possess a detailed understanding of the
legislation and are always anxious to ensure that they comply both with the
legislation and the appropriate safeguards. All applications made to the Secretary
of State are scrutinised by officials in the warrants unit within their respective
Departments (e.g., the Home Office, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Defence and by similar officers in departments in the Northern Ireland Office and
Scottish Executive). They are all skilled in their work and there is very little
danger of any defective application being placed before the Secretary of State. I
will refer in some detail to errors which have occurred during the period under
review. Where errors have occurred, they are errors of detail or procedure and not
of substance. The Agencies always make available to me personnel and
documents that I have requested. They welcome my oversight as ensuring that
they are acting lawfully and appropriately and seeking my advice and as a
reassurance to the general public that their activities are overseen by an
independent person who has held high judicial office. I am left in no doubt at all
as to the Agencies’ commitment to comply with the law. In case of doubt or
difficulty, they do not hesitate to contact me and to seek advice.
9. During the first nine months of my appointment I have not had the
opportunity of meeting the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary
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