during the same period and the vast majority of these were for subscriber
information under Section 21 (4)(c) of RIPA. Local Authorities are restricted to
acquiring communications data for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime
and mostly this involves the investigation of offences by the Trading Standards
Service, Environmental Control and Housing Benefits Departments. Invariably
communications data is only applied for as a last resort and to identify suspected
criminals, including rogue traders, fly tippers and fraudsters. Since the inspection
regime was formed in May 2005 my Inspectors have visited 44 Local Authorities
and they have been satisfied that they have been acquiring communications data
lawfully and for the correct purpose. Naturally the Inspectors have been
concentrating upon the Local Authorities which have made the most use of their
powers and the remainder, which have still to be visited, have generally made only
a handful of requests.
23. During the period covered by my Report only six of the Fire Services used
their powers to acquire communications data and they generated a few requests
for subscriber information. Of the 110 other public authorities, only 32 are using
their powers. I am a little concerned that there continues to be a number of
authorities who applied for the powers to be given to them and who apparently do
not use them and I do not know why this is so. It may be that they have not as yet
set up appropriate mechanisms to obtain communications data, but if this state of
affairs continues unexplained, then consideration must be given to removing the
powers from them.
24. Inspections have taken place of all those authorities that are making
significant use of their powers. Inevitably, the results have been variable. On the
whole, however, the Inspectors have been impressed by the systems in place and
by the fact that the applications are being made in accordance with the law and
the draft Code of Practice. The objectives of the inspections are broadly similar
to those with police forces.
25. Following the inspections, full Reports together with Action Plans have been
sent to the Local or Public Authority concerned. They have been welcomed, and
the recommendations accepted.
Interception in Prisons
26. I have, at the request of the Home Secretary, continued in a non-statutory
role, the oversight of the interception of communications in prisons, which was
undertaken by my predecessor. Interception of communications (mail and
telephone communications) in prisons is permitted, and in many cases is
mandatory, under the Prison Act 1952, and the National Security Framework
(NSF). Interception is mandatory primarily in the case of Category A prisoners,
and prisoners who have been convicted of sexual or harassment offences, and
continue to present a risk to the public. So far as Category A prisoners are
concerned, this presents a problem in many prisons, because they do not have the
resources to monitor all the telephone communications. The same can apply to
those convicted of sexual or harassment offences, particularly if they are gathered
together in one prison.
27. Interception is illegal and a breach of the Human Rights Act unless it is
carried out in accordance with the Act and the NSF.
28. There are three primary areas of inspection:
G
the methods utilised for the interception of telephone and postal
communications to ensure that the interception is being carried out lawfully;
G
a physical inspection of the interception of telephone communications and
the equipment utilised;
G
a physical inspection of the arrangements for the interception of postal
communications.
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