BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
a review of the errors reported, including checking that the
measures put in place to prevent recurrence were sufficient.
172. After each inspection, inspectors produced a report, including:
an assessment of how far the recommendations from the previous
inspection had been achieved;
a summary of the number and type of interception documents
selected for inspection, including a detailed list of those warrants;
detailed comments on all warrants selected for further
examination and discussion during the inspection;
an assessment of the errors reported to the IC Commissioner’s
office during the inspection period;
an account of the examination of the retention, storage and
destruction procedures;
an account of other policy or operational issues which the agency
or warrant-granting departments raised during the inspection;
an assessment of how any material subject to legal professional
privilege (or otherwise confidential material) had been handled;
and
a number of recommendations aimed at improving compliance
and performance.
173. During 2016, the IC Commissioner’s office inspected all nine
interception agencies once and the four main warrant-granting departments
twice. This, together with extra visits to GCHQ, made a total of twenty-two
inspection visits. In addition, he and his inspectors arranged other ad hoc
visits to agencies.
174. Inspection of the systems in place for applying for and authorising
interception warrants usually involved a three-stage process. First, to
achieve a representative sample of warrants, inspectors selected them across
different crime types and national security threats. In addition, inspectors
focussed on those of particular interest or sensitivity (such as those which
gave rise to an unusual degree of collateral intrusion, those which had been
extant for a considerable period, those which were approved orally, those
which resulted in the interception of legal or otherwise confidential
communications, and so-called “thematic” warrants). Secondly, inspectors
scrutinised the selected warrants and associated documentation in detail
during reading days which preceded the inspections. At this stage,
inspectors were able to examine the necessity and proportionality statements
made by analysts when adding a selector to the collection system for
examination. Each statement had to stand on its own and had to refer to the
overall requirement of priorities for intelligence collection. Thirdly, they
identified those warrants, operations or areas of the process which required
further information or clarification and arranged to interview relevant
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