BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
associated communications data, but only subject to strict
additional safeguards including the authorisation of all warrants
by a Judicial Commissioner at a new Independent Surveillance
and Intelligence Commission (“ISIC”);
the spelling out in the accompanying certificate of the purposes
for which material or data were sought by reference to specific
operations or mission purposes (for example, “attack planning by
ISIL in Iraq/Syria against the UK”);
the creation of a new form of bulk warrant limited to the
acquisition of communications data which could be a
proportionate option in certain cases;
the ISIC should take over intelligence oversight functions and
should be public-facing, transparent and accessible to the media;
and
the IPT should have the capacity to make declarations of
incompatibility and its rulings should be subject to appeals on
points of law.
4. A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent
Surveillance Review (“ISR”)
156. The ISR was undertaken by the Royal United Services Institute, an
independent think-tank, at the request of the then deputy Prime Minister,
partly in response to the revelations by Edward Snowden. Its terms of
reference were to look at the legality of United Kingdom surveillance
programmes and the effectiveness of the regimes that governed them, and to
suggest reforms which might be necessary to protect both individual privacy
and the necessary capabilities of the police and security and intelligence
services.
157. Having completed its review the ISR found no evidence that the
British Government was knowingly acting illegally in intercepting private
communications, or that the ability to collect data in bulk was being used by
the Government to provide it with a perpetual window into the private lives
of British citizens. On the other hand, it found evidence that the existing
legal framework authorising the interception of communications was
unclear, had not kept pace with developments in communications’
technology, and did not serve either the Government or members of the
public satisfactorily. It therefore concluded that a new, comprehensive and
clearer legal framework was required.
158. In particular, it supported the view set out in both the ISC and
Anderson Report that while the current surveillance powers were needed,
both a new legislative framework and oversight regime were required. It
further considered that the definitions of “content” and “communications
data” should be reviewed as part of the drafting of the new legislation so
that they could be delineated clearly in law.
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