BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
“(5) Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes ...”
and
“(7) Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or
destruction of, or damage to, personal data.”
(f) The Official Secrets Act 1989 (“the OSA”)
114. A member of the intelligence services would commit an offence
under section 1(1) of the OSA if he or she disclosed, without lawful
authority, any information, document or other article relating to security or
intelligence which was in his or her possession by virtue of his or her
position as a member of those services.
(g) The Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”)
115. Pursuant to section 6 of the HRA, it was unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which was incompatible with a Convention right.
3. The Interception of Communications Code of Practice
116. Following the Liberty proceedings, the information contained in the
9 October disclosure (see paragraphs 33 and 36 above) was incorporated
into the IC Code:
“12. RULES FOR REQUESTING AND HANDLING UNANALYSED
INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS FROM A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
Application of this chapter
12.1. This chapter applies to those intercepting agencies that undertake interception
under a section 8(4) warrant.
Requests for assistance other than in accordance with an international mutual
assistance agreement
12.2. A request may only be made by an intercepting agency to the government of a
country or territory outside the UK for unanalysed intercepted communications (and
associated communications data), otherwise than in accordance with an international
mutual assistance agreement, if either:
A relevant interception warrant under RIPA has already been issued by the
Secretary of State, the assistance of the foreign government is necessary to
obtain the particular communications because they cannot be obtained
under the relevant RIPA interception warrant and it is necessary and
proportionate for the intercepting agency to obtain those communications;
or
Making the request for the particular communications in the absence of a
relevant RIPA interception warrant does not amount to a deliberate
circumvention of RIPA or otherwise frustrate the objectives of RIPA (for
example, because it is not technically feasible to obtain the
41