BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
4.29. Material which has been identified as confidential information should be
retained only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so for one or more of the
authorised purposes set out in section 15(4). It must be securely destroyed when its
retention is no longer needed for those purposes. If such information is retained, there
must be adequate information management systems in place to ensure that continued
retention remains necessary and proportionate for the authorised statutory purposes.
4.30. Where confidential information is retained or disseminated to an outside
body, reasonable steps should be taken to mark the information as confidential. Where
there is any doubt as to the lawfulness of the proposed handling or dissemination of
confidential information, advice should be sought from a legal adviser within the
relevant intercepting agency and before any further dissemination of the material
takes place.
4.31. Any case where confidential information is retained should be notified to the
Interception of Communications Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable, as
agreed with the Commissioner. Any material which has been retained should be made
available to the Commissioner on request.
4.32. The safeguards set out in paragraphs 4.28 – 4.31 also apply to any section 8(4)
material (see chapter 6) which is selected for examination and which constitutes
confidential information.
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6. INTERCEPTION WARRANTS (SECTION 8(4))
6.1. This section applies to the interception of external communications by means
of a warrant complying with section 8(4) of RIPA.
6.2. In contrast to section 8(1), a section 8(4) warrant instrument need not name or
describe the interception subject or a set of premises in relation to which the
interception is to take place. Neither does section 8(4) impose an express limit on the
number of external communications which may be intercepted. For example, if the
requirements of sections 8(4) and (5) are met, then the interception of all
communications transmitted on a particular route or cable, or carried by a particular
CSP, could, in principle, be lawfully authorised. This reflects the fact that section 8(4)
interception is an intelligence gathering capability, whereas section 8(1) interception
is primarily an investigative tool that is used once a particular subject for interception
has been identified.
6.3. Responsibility for the issuing of interception warrants under section 8(4) of
RIPA rests with the Secretary of State. When the Secretary of State issues a warrant of
this kind, it must be accompanied by a certificate. The certificate ensures that a
selection process is applied to the intercepted material so that only material described
in the certificate is made available for human examination. If the intercepted material
cannot be selected to be read, looked at or listened to with due regard to
proportionality and the terms of the certificate, then it cannot be read, looked at or
listened to by anyone.
Section 8(4) interception in practice
6.4. A section 8(4) warrant authorises the interception of external communications.
Where a section 8(4) warrant results in the acquisition of large volumes of
communications, the intercepting agency will ordinarily apply a filtering process to
automatically discard communications that are unlikely to be of intelligence value.
Authorised persons within the intercepting agency may then apply search criteria to
select communications that are likely to be of intelligence value in accordance with
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