BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT –
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING
OPINION OF JUDGE PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE
I. Introduction (§ 1)
II. Deconstruction of the Court’s pro autoritate regime of bulk
interception (§§ 2-18)
A. Vague language (§ 2-3)
B. Biased methodology (§§ 4-12)
C. Defective regime of safeguards (§§ 13-15)
D. Preliminary conclusion (§§ 16-18)
III. Construction of a pro persona regime of bulk interception
(§§ 19-34)
A. Bulk interception of communications (§§ 19-29)
B. Exchange of intercept data with foreign intelligence services
(§§ 30-31)
C. Bulk interception of related communications data (§ 32)
D. Preliminary conclusion (§§ 33-34)
IV. Critique of the impugned UK bulk interception regime (§§ 35-58)
A. Bulk interception of communications under RIPA (§§ 35-49)
B. Exchange of intercept data with foreign intelligence services under
Chapter 12 of the IC Code (§§ 50-54)
C. Bulk interception of related communications data under RIPA
(§§ 55-57)
D. Preliminary conclusion (§ 58)
V. Conclusion (§§ 59-60)
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. I voted with the majority, except for the finding of no violation of
Articles 8 and 10 in respect of the receipt of intercepted material from
foreign intelligence services, namely of the bulk material intercepted by the
United States National Security Agency (NSA) under the PRISM and
Upstream programmes. In addition, I do not agree with the core of the
majority’s reasoning regarding the finding of a violation of Articles 8 and
10. The purpose of this opinion is to present the reasons for my
disagreement1.
1 This is the second time that I have written a separate opinion on bulk interception. In
Szábo and Vissy v. Hungary, no. 37138/14, 12 January 2016, I had the opportunity to state
my views on the slippery slope in which the Hungarian bulk interception regime had
engaged and the undesirable consequences lurking at the bottom of the slope. In view of the
discussion held in the Grand Chamber, and after careful weighing of all the conflicting
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