BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
507. As for the safeguards for the examination, use, storage, onward
transmission, erasure and destruction of the solicited intercept material, it
was clear from paragraph 12.6 of the IC Code that intercepted content or
related communications data obtained by the United Kingdom intelligence
services from another State, which identified themselves as the product of
intercept, had to be subject to the same internal rules and safeguards that
applied to the same categories of content or data when they were obtained
directly by the intercepting agencies as a result of interception under RIPA.
Consequently, the safeguards in sections 15 and 16 of RIPA, as
supplemented by the IC Code, applied equally to intercepted
communications and communications data obtained from foreign
intelligence services, provided that the material “identified itself as the
product of intercept”.
508. The Court has examined the section 15 and section 16 safeguards in
respect of the bulk interception regime and it was satisfied that the
procedures for storing, accessing, examining and using the material
obtained; for communicating the material to other parties; and for the
erasure and destruction of the material obtained were sufficiently clear and
afforded adequate protection against abuse (see paragraphs 384-405 above).
In light of the Court’s findings at paragraph 498 above, it notes that
paragraph 12.6 of the IC does not extend the safeguards in sections 15
and 16 of RIPA, as supplemented by the IC Code, to all material received
from foreign intelligence services that could be the product of intercept,
limiting these safeguards only to material that identified itself as such;
however, the Court does not consider this fact alone to be fatal to the
Article 8 compliance of the intelligence sharing regime.
509. In the context of the section 8(4) regime, the Court had concerns
about the exemption of related communications data from the section 16
safeguard. However, under the section 8(4) regime the State was able to
intercept, store and search all packets of communications travelling across
certain bearers. The blanket exemption of related communications data from
the section 16 safeguard therefore meant that all of these data, regardless of
whether they were of any intelligence interest, could be searched by the
intelligence services apparently without restriction. Under Chapter 12 of the
IC Code, on the other hand, content and related communications data were
not requested by the intelligence services in bulk. Paragraph 12.5 of the IC
Code, together with its accompanying footnote, indicated that where a
request was based on an existing warrant that request would be made to,
from or about specific selectors (that is, specified individuals) and the
Secretary of State would already have approved the request for the
communications of those individuals. While in exceptional circumstances a
request could be made in the absence of a warrant, the Secretary of State
personally had to approve the request and, if based on specific selectors, he
or she personally had to consider and approve the examination of those
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