BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
oversight bodies from the third States involved in the intelligence sharing;
and hire independent specialists, with expertise in modern information and
communications technology, where required.
(vii)Human Rights Watch (“HRW”)
488. Although the present applications focused on the receipt of foreign
intelligence from the United States, HRW believed that the network of
States with which communications intelligence was shared was vastly
larger. For example the “Five Eyes Alliance” comprised the United
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and there
were also thought to be other, more restricted intelligence sharing coalitions
(for example, the “Nine Eyes”, adding Denmark, France, the Netherlands
and Norway; the “Fourteen Eyes”, adding Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain
and Sweden; and the “Forty-One Eyes”, adding in others in the allied
coalition in Afghanistan).
(viii)Open Society Justice Initiative (“OSJI”)
489. OSJI argued that States should not receive or request data from a
third party in a manner that circumvented individuals’ Article 8 rights. To
ensure that this did not happen, safeguards were required at the point when
the material was first gathered, including prior scrutiny of the human rights
record and interception laws and practices in the foreign State, and
independent, preferably judicial, a posteriori oversight of any sharing
arrangements to ensure that the safeguards were in place and enforced.
(ix) The Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”)
490. EPIC submitted that United States’ law authorised mass,
indiscriminate surveillance of non-US persons. This surveillance took place
pursuant to section 702 of FISA and Executive Order 12333. Surveillance
under section 702 took place in the United States with the compelled
assistance of service providers and it targeted non-US persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States. There was no prior judicial
review of surveillance activity; no reasonable suspicion was required; and
there was no statutory obligation to notify subjects of surveillance. All that
was required was that the FISC annually review the targeting and
minimization procedures aimed at limiting the acquisition of the
communications of US persons or persons located in the United States.
491. Executive Order 12333 authorised the NSA to acquire foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence. The order provided broad authority to
conduct signals intelligence surveillance from a wide variety of sources,
including fibre optic networks. Collection occurred outside the territory of
the United States. There were no reports or official disclosures concerning
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