BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
that there has also been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention by virtue
of the operation of the section 8(4) regime.
III. THE RECEIPT OF INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
FROM
FOREIGN
A. Article 8 of the Convention
459. The applicants in the first of the joined cases complained about the
receipt by the United Kingdom authorities of material from foreign
intelligence services. The applicants in the third of the joined cases
complained more specifically that the respondent State’s receipt of material
intercepted by the NSA under PRISM and Upstream was in breach of their
rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
1. Scope of the complaint before the Grand Chamber
460. In the Liberty proceedings the IPT identified three categories of
material which could be received from foreign intelligence partners:
unsolicited intercept material; solicited intercept material; and non-intercept
material. As the Government informed the Chamber that it was “implausible
and rare” for intercept material to be obtained “unsolicited”, the Chamber
did not examine material falling into this category (see paragraph 417 of the
Chamber judgment). The Chamber also declined to examine the receipt of
non-intercept material, since the applicants had not specified the kind of
material foreign intelligence services might obtain by methods other than
interception and, as such, it was not satisfied that they had demonstrated
that its acquisition would interfere with their Article 8 rights (see
paragraph 449 of the Chamber judgment). The applicants have not contested
either of these findings.
461. Furthermore, as the Liberty proceedings were brought by the
applicants in the third of the joined cases, the IPT only considered the
receipt of intelligence from the NSA. In their submissions before the
Chamber and the Grand Chamber, the parties also focused on the receipt of
material from the NSA.
462. The Grand Chamber will therefore limit its examination to the
complaint about the receipt of solicited intercept material from the NSA.
2. The Government’s preliminary objection
463. The Government argued that the applicants in the first and third of
the joined cases could not claim to be victims of the alleged violation
because neither of the two conditions in Roman Zakharov (cited above,
§171) were met (namely, the applicants could not possibly have been
affected by the legislation permitting secret surveillance measures, and
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