BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
hearings, in public, where possible (see paragraph 129 above); in closed
proceedings it could ask Counsel to the Tribunal to make submissions on
behalf of claimants who could not be represented (see paragraph 132
above); and when it determined a complaint it had the power to award
compensation and make any other order it saw fit, including quashing or
cancelling any warrant and requiring the destruction of any records (see
paragraph 126 above). Finally, its legal rulings were published on its own
dedicated website, thereby enhancing the level of scrutiny afforded to secret
surveillance activities in the United Kingdom (see Kennedy, cited above,
§ 167).
414. In addition, the IPT had jurisdiction to consider any complaint
about the Convention compliance either of the transfer of intercept material
to third parties, or about the regime governing the transfer of intercept
material. In the present case, however, the applicants in the third of the
joined cases did not make any specific complaint in this respect in the
course of the domestic proceedings. Rather, their complaints about
intelligence sharing focused solely on the regime governing the receipt of
intelligence from third countries (see paragraphs 467-516 below).
415. The Court is therefore satisfied that the IPT provided a robust
judicial remedy to anyone who suspected that his or her communications
had been intercepted by the intelligence services.
(3) Related communications data
416. The Court has indicated that in the context of bulk interception the
interception, retention and searching of related communications data should
be analysed by reference to the same safeguards applicable to content, but
that the legal provisions governing the treatment of related communications
data do not necessarily have to be identical in every respect to those
governing the treatment of content (see paragraphs 363-364 above). In the
United Kingdom section 8(4) warrants authorised the interception of both
content and related communications data. The latter were, in most respects,
treated identically under the section 8(4) regime. Thus, the deficiencies
already identified in respect of that regime governing the interception of
content (see paragraphs 377, 381 and 382 above) applied equally to related
communications data, namely: the absence of independent authorisation
(see paragraph 377 above); the failure to identify the categories of selectors
in the application for a warrant (see paragraphs 381 and 382 above) and the
failure to subject those selectors linked to identifiable individuals to prior
internal authorisation; and the lack of foreseeability of the circumstances in
which communications could be examined (see paragraph 391 above),
having regard both to the failure to identify the categories of selectors in the
application for a warrant (see paragraphs 381 and 382 above) and to the
general nature of the Secretary of State’s certificate (see paragraph 386
above).
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