BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
408. The IC Commissioner’s 2016 report provides evidence of the
extent of his oversight powers. In summary, during inspections he evaluated
the systems in place for the interception of communications and ensured
that all relevant records had been kept; examined selected interception
applications to assess whether they met the necessity and proportionality
requirements; interviewed case officers and analysts to assess whether
interceptions and the justifications for acquiring all of the material were
proportionate; examined any urgent oral approvals to check that the process
was justified and used appropriately; reviewed those cases where
communications subject to legal privilege or otherwise confidential
information had been intercepted and retained, and any cases where a
lawyer was the subject of an investigation; reviewed the adequacy of the
safeguards and arrangements under sections 15 and 16 of RIPA;
investigated the procedures in place for the retention, storage and
destruction of intercepted material and related communications data; and
reviewed reported errors and the sufficiency of any measures put in place to
prevent recurrence (see paragraph 171 above).
409. During 2016, the IC Commissioner’s office inspected all nine
interception agencies once and the four main warrant-granting departments
twice. Nine hundred and seventy warrants were inspected, representing
sixty-one percent of the number of warrants in force at the end of the year
and thirty-two percent of the total of new warrants issued in 2016 (see
paragraphs 173 and 175 above).
410. Inspections usually involved a three-stage process. First, to achieve
a representative sample of warrants, inspectors selected them across
different crime types and national security threats, focusing on those of
particular interest or sensitivity. Secondly, inspectors scrutinized the
selected warrants and associated documentation in detail during reading
days which preceded the inspections. At this stage, inspectors examined the
necessity and proportionality statements made by analysts when adding a
selector to the collection system for examination. Each statement had to
stand on its own and had to refer to the overall requirement of priorities for
intelligence collection. Thirdly, they identified those warrants, operations or
areas of the process which required further information or clarification and
arranged to interview relevant operational, legal or technical staff. Where
necessary, they examined further documentation or systems relating to those
warrants (see paragraph 174 above).
411. The IC Commissioner also had oversight of the sharing of intercept
material with intelligence partners. In his 2016 report he indicated that
GCHQ had provided his inspectors with “comprehensive details of the
sharing arrangements whereby Five Eyes partners can access elements of
the product of GCHQ’s interception warrants on their own systems”. In
addition, his inspectors were able to meet with representatives of the Five
Eyes community and they received a demonstration of how other Five Eyes
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