BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
purposes mentioned in section 5(3) of RIPA; for facilitating the carrying out
of any of the interception functions of the Secretary of State; for facilitating
the carrying out of any functions of the IC Commissioner or of the IPT; to
ensure that a person conducting a criminal prosecution had the information
he or she needed to determine what was required by the duty to secure the
fairness of the prosecution (although the intercept material could not itself
be used in the prosecution of a criminal offence – see paragraph 8.3 of the
IC Code at paragraph 96 above); or for the performance of any duty
imposed on any person under public records legislation (see paragraphs 80
and 96 above).
393. Paragraph 7.3 of the IC Code prohibited disclosure to persons who
had not been appropriately vetted and also by the “need-to-know” principle:
intercepted material could not be disclosed to any person unless that
person’s duties, which had to relate to one of the authorised purposes, were
such that he or she “needed to know” about the intercept material to carry
out those duties. In the same way, only so much of the intercept material
could be disclosed as the recipient needed (see paragraph 96 above).
Paragraph 7.3 applied equally to disclosure to additional persons within an
agency, and to disclosure outside the agency (see paragraph 96 above).
Pursuant to paragraph 7.4, it also applied not just to the original interceptor,
but also to anyone to whom the intercept material was subsequently
disclosed (see paragraph 96 above).
394. As the Chamber observed, since “likely to become necessary” was
not further defined in RIPA or the IC Code, or indeed anywhere else,
section 15(4) and paragraph 7.2 could in practice have given the authorities
a broad power to disclose and copy intercept material. Nevertheless, the
material could still only be disclosed to a person with the appropriate level
of security clearance, who had a “need to know”, and only so much of the
intercept material as the individual needed to know could be disclosed. The
Court therefore agrees with the Chamber that the inclusion of “likely to
become necessary” did not significantly reduce the safeguards for the
protection of data obtained by bulk interception (see paragraphs 368
and 369 of the Chamber judgment).
395. Turning, then, to the transfer of intercept material outside the
United Kingdom, where material has been intercepted in accordance with
domestic law, the Court considers that the transfer of that material to a
foreign intelligence partner or international organisation would only give
rise to an issue under Article 8 of the Convention if the intercepting State
did not first ensure that its intelligence partner, in handling the material, had
in place safeguards capable of preventing abuse and disproportionate
interference, and in particular, could guarantee the secure storage of the
material and restrict its onward disclosure (see paragraph 362 above).
396. In the United Kingdom it would appear that Five Eyes partners
could access elements of the product of GCHQ’s interception warrants on
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